On the optimal negligence standard in tort law when one party is a long-run and the other a short-run player

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On the optimal negligence standard in tort law when one party is a long-run and the other a short-run player

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dc.contributor.author Lando, Henrik en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:24:56Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:24:56Z
dc.date.issued 2005-12-09T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6828
dc.format.extent 8 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries LEFIC Working paper;2005-002 en_US
dc.title On the optimal negligence standard in tort law when one party is a long-run and the other a short-run player en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt05dec09 miel en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Industriøkonomi og Virksomhedsstrategi en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort LEFIC en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Industrial Economics & Strategy en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort IES en_US
dc.idnumber x656504160 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2005 en_US


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