The Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations

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The Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations

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Title: The Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations
Author: Knudsen, Thorbjørn
Abstract: How does population dynamics influence outcomes in situations with public good characteristics? The present paper answers this question by analysing the evolution of costly cooperation in a multi-group population. Building on insights first developed in modern biology the idea of viscous population equilibria is introduced (a population is said to be viscous when a (sub)population of players is spatially or genetically clustered). A simple model then analyses how the combined effect of viscosity within multiple subgroups and different levels of between-group segregation influences the evolution of cooperation. The results suggest that a key issue in the evolution of cooperation is the shifting balance between the need to protect cooperators and propagation of the tendency to cooperate.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6880
Date: 2004-03-18

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