The Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations


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The Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations

Vis færre oplysninger Knudsen, Thorbjørn en_US 2009-02-04T10:25:23Z 2009-02-04T10:25:23Z 2004-03-18T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.description.abstract How does population dynamics influence outcomes in situations with public good characteristics? The present paper answers this question by analysing the evolution of costly cooperation in a multi-group population. Building on insights first developed in modern biology the idea of viscous population equilibria is introduced (a population is said to be viscous when a (sub)population of players is spatially or genetically clustered). A simple model then analyses how the combined effect of viscosity within multiple subgroups and different levels of between-group segregation influences the evolution of cooperation. The results suggest that a key issue in the evolution of cooperation is the shifting balance between the need to protect cooperators and propagation of the tendency to cooperate. en_US
dc.format.extent 30 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries LINK Working paper;2001-26 en_US
dc.subject.other kep en_US
dc.title The Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for International Økonomi og Virksomhedsledelse
dc.contributor.departmentshort INT
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of International Economics and Management
dc.contributor.departmentukshort INT
dc.idnumber x656406339 en_US København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2001 en_US

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