The Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations

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dc.contributor.author	Knudsen, Thorbjørn	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2009-02-04T10:25:23Z
dc.date.available	2009-02-04T10:25:23Z
dc.date.issued	2004-03-18T00:00:00Z	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6880
dc.description.abstract	How does population dynamics influence outcomes in situations with public good characteristics? The present paper answers this question by analysing the evolution of costly cooperation in a multi-group population. Building on insights first developed in modern biology the idea of viscous population equilibria is introduced (a population is said to be viscous when a (sub)population of players is spatially or genetically clustered). A simple model then analyses how the combined effect of viscosity within multiple subgroups and different levels of between-group segregation influences the evolution of cooperation. The results suggest that a key issue in the evolution of cooperation is the shifting balance between the need to protect cooperators and propagation of the tendency to cooperate.	en_US
dc.format.extent	30 s.	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	LINK Working paper;2001-26	en_US
dc.subject.other	kep	en_US
dc.title	The Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Institut for International Økonomi og Virksomhedsledelse
dc.contributor.departmentshort	INT
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Department of International Economics and Management
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	INT
dc.idnumber	x656406339	en_US
dc.publisher.city	København	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2001	en_US