Why Tacit Knowledge Protects the Firm's Evolutionary Potential (And Why Codification Doesn't)

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Why Tacit Knowledge Protects the Firm's Evolutionary Potential (And Why Codification Doesn't)

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dc.contributor.author Knudsen, Thorbjørn en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:25:24Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:25:24Z
dc.date.issued 2004-03-23T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6889
dc.description.abstract The present article introduces the theory of cultural evolution as a possible basis for further development of a micro-evolutionary economic theory. Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and involves social transmission of explicit knowledge by choice or imposition. A possible complementary Darwinian principle operating in the social realm is defined in terms of social transmission of tacit knowledge. According to this principle, termed Local Emulative Selection, some forms of tacit knowledge are not adapted (those which cannot be reached by consciousness) by their carrier. I then identify a problem of adaptation that plagues any form of Lamarckian selection. This base-line problem implies that the evolutionary potential decreases as the possibility of adaptation increases. In consequence, the social transmission of tacit knowledge, which cannot be reached by consciousness, protects the evolutionary potential associated with any form of social evolution. By contrast, it is suggested that a systematic codification of tacit knowledge can potentially corrupt the evolutionary potential of any organisation. en_US
dc.format.extent 41 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries LINK Working paper;2000-21 en_US
dc.subject.other kep en_US
dc.title Why Tacit Knowledge Protects the Firm's Evolutionary Potential (And Why Codification Doesn't) en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for International Økonomi og Virksomhedsledelse
dc.contributor.departmentshort INT
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of International Economics and Management
dc.contributor.departmentukshort INT
dc.idnumber x656406509 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2000 en_US


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