Browsing Working Papers (ECON) by Title
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Schmitt, Nicolas; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We examine the interaction between commodity taxes and parallel imports in a simple two-country model with imperfect competition. While governments determine non-cooperatively their commodity tax rate, the volume of parallel imports is determined endogenously by the retailing sector. We compare the positive and normative implications of having commodity taxes based on destination or origin principle. Origin taxes are shown to have very attractive properties: they lead to lower levels of optimal taxes, they converge as parallel imports increase (while destination taxes diverge), and they lead to higher welfare levels. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7538 Files in this item: 1
wp.04.07.pdf (360.3Kb) -
limits to competition policy harmonisation in EU enlargementLorentzen, Jochen; Møllgaard, Peter (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Tvede, Mich; Olai Hansen, Bodil (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings just before the transfer window closes in european soccer. competition between sports clubs, dimension of quality of players, equilibrium in pure strategies, equilibrium in mixed strategies. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7555 Files in this item: 1
wp10-2007.pdf (380.2Kb) -
Møllgaard, Peter; Kastberg Nielsen, Claus (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
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Baghdasaryan, Delia; la Cour, Lisbeth (København, 2009)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This study empirically investigates if competition’s impact on firm performance depends on the ownership structure. Our results show that an increase in import competition has a positive effect on firms with concentrated ownership and a negative effect on firms with dispersed ownership, regardless of the level of domestic competition. Given that the optimal level of ownership concentration with respect to firm productivity is high (low) if tariffs are low (high) in the case when import competition is high these results are consistent with theoretical findings that competition has positive effects in companies that are a priori efficient but not in unproductive firms. If tariffs are high, however, they support inferences based on the x-inefficiency literature. Contrary to what has been suggested by some theoretical results, the riskiness of a firm’s environment does not seem to influence our results. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7660 Files in this item: 1
wp1-2009.pdf (296.5Kb) -
Møllgaard, Peter; Lorentzen, Jo (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We briefly review the rationale behind technological alliances and provide a snapshot of their role in global competition, especially insofar as it is based around intellectual capital. They nicely illustrate the increased importance of horizontal agreements and thus establish the relevance of the topic. We move on to discuss the organisation of industries in a dynamic context and draw out consequences for competition policy. We conclude with an outlook on the underlying tensions between technology alliances, competition policy, and industrial policy. JEL codes: L4, L5, O31 Keywords: Competition policy, innovation, alliances, industrial policy URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7635 Files in this item: 1
wp9-2005.pdf (194.6Kb) -
la Cour, Lisbeth Funding (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Kreickemeier, Udo (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We show that the standard concertina result for tariff reforms – i.e. lowering the highest tariff increases welfare – no longer holds in general if we allow for international capital mobility. The result can break down if the good whose tariff is lowered is not capital intensive. If the concertina reform lowers welfare it lowers market access as well, thereby compromising a second goal that is typically connected with trade liberalisation. JEL-Classification: F11, F13, F15 Key words: Trade Policy Reform, International Factor Mobility, Welfare, Market Access URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7637 Files in this item: 1
wp5-2006.pdf (157.8Kb) -
Bennedsen, Morten; Fosgerau, Mogens; Wolfenzon, Daniel (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Marker-Larsen, Svend (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
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Marker-Larsen, Svend (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: De i denne fremstilling omtalte problemstillinger blev kun ganske kort præsenteret i min oversigtsartikel om "Cost-Benefit Analysens Velfærdsteoretiske Basis" (2005). Det blev deri præciseret, at identifikationsproblemet drejede sig om: Præcis hvilke effekter, der i det hele taget skal medregnes som samfundsøkonomiske fordele og ulemper, hvis analysen skal være fuldstændig og at vurderingsproblemet så drejede sig om spørgsmålet: Hvilke priser, der skal anvendes i forbindelse med værdisætningen af fordele og ulemper. Endvidere blev der givet en summarisk oversigt over en række situationer, hvor man må kunne bruge de aktuelle eller forventede markedspriser, når fordele og ulemper skal værdisættes. I det følgende gives først en mere udførlig redegørelse for nogle af de helt centrale ræsonnementer vedrørende vurderingsproblemet. Sidenhen fører det forholdsvis logisk frem til, at også identifikationsproblemet i en række væsentlige henseender bliver yderligere belyst. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7641 Files in this item: 1
wp7-2005.pdf (1.579Mb) -
Hviid, Morten; Møllgård, Peter (Norwich, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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On the Dynamics of Competitive ScreeningLund, Diderik; Nilssen, Tore (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Abstract We discuss the existence of a pooling equilibrium in a two-period model of an insurance market with asymmetric information. We solve the model numerically. We pay particular attention to the reasons for non-existence in cases where no pooling equilibrium exists. In addition to the phenom- enon of cream skimming emphasized in earlier literature, we here point to the the importance of the opposite: dregs skimming, whereby high-risk consumers are proÞtably detracted from the candidate pooling contract. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7596 Files in this item: 1
wpec012003.pdf (380.8Kb) -
Vinten, Frederik; Thomsen, Steen (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We analyze delistings from European stock exchanges 1995-2005 as a function of market conditions, firm effects and governance regulation. We find that investor protection and corporate governance quality reduce the likelihood of going private, bankrupt or liquidated, but increase the likelihood of exit by merger or acquisition. Taking into consideration that corporate governance policy may be endogenously determined, the estimated policy effects turn out to be highly sensitive to model specification, but our best estimates produce qualitatively similar results. We conclude that the evidence is most consistent with efficient regulation: better protection of minority investors and higher corporate governance quality stimulates the market for corporate control (M&A) and reduces the incentive to go private. However, going private transactions have increased significantly while governance standards have been improved over the past decade, and we would not ignore the possibility that more regulation would lead to more delistings. For example, we find indications that the adoption of corporate governance codes and changes in the level of corporate governance indices increase the propensity to go private. It seems likely that increasing investor protection will at some point add more costs than benefits to companies and investors. Governments should therefore consider both costs and benefits of further regulation. Key words: Delisting, public listing, mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcy, liquidation, going private, private equity, investor protection. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7504 Files in this item: 1
wp12-06.pdf (330.3Kb) -
Larsen, Birthe; Waisman, Gisela (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We exploit the regional variation in negative attitudes towards immigrants to Sweden in order to analyse what are the consequences of such attitudes have on immigrants welfare. A well educated immigrant from a non developed country who lives in a municipality with strong negative attitudes earns less than what she would earn if she lived in a municipality where natives are more positive. If attitudes changed from the average level to the most positive level, her wage would increase by 12%. This would reduce the wage gap to well-educated immigrants from developed countries by 70%. We interpret this eect as evidence of labour market discrimination. The same reduction in negative attitudes would increase the welfare of immigrants from Africa and Asia, through their wage and local amenities, by an equivalent to one third of their wage. The analogous amount for immigrants from South America and Eastern Europe is one fourth of their wage if they are well educated and one tenth otherwise. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7587 Files in this item: 1
wp11-2007.pdf (1.182Mb) -
Pérez-González, Francisco; Wolfenzon, Daniel; Bennedsen, Morten (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Abstract. Estimating the value of top managerial talent is a central topic of research that has attracted widespread attention from academics and practitioners. Yet, testing for the importance of chief executive officers (CEOs) on firm outcomes is challenging. In this paper we test for the impact of CEOs on performance by assessing the effect of (1) CEO deaths and (2) the death of CEOs immediate family members (spouse, parents, children, etc), which arguably affects CEOs focus. Using a unique dataset from Denmark, we find that CEO (but not board members ) own and family deaths are strongly correlated with declines in firm operating profitability, investment and sales growth. Our CEO shock-outcome analysis allows us to identify the shocks that are the most (least) meaningful for CEOs: the death of children and spouses (mothers-in-law). We show that individual CEO, firm and industry characteristics seem to affect the impact of these shocks. In particular, CEO effects are larger (lower) for longer-tenured (older) CEOs and for those managers with large investment fixed effects. CEO shocks are relevant across the size distribution of firms but are concentrated on those firms that invested heavily in the past. Lastly, we find that CEO shocks tend to be larger in rapid growth, high investment and R&D intensive industries. Overall, our findings demonstrate managers are a key determinant of firm performance. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7523 Files in this item: 1
wp13-2007.pdf (1.169Mb) -
Filges, Trine; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: While examining the macroeconomic effects of government tax and punishment policies, this paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Workers are assumed to differ in ability, and the choice of education is determined endogenously. Job opportunities in an informal sector are available only to workers who choose not to acquire higher education. We find that increased punishment of informal activities increases the number of educated workers and reduces the number of unemployed workers. Considering welfare, we show it is optimal to choose punishment rates so to more than fully counteract the distortion created by the government’s inability to tax the informal sector. JEL-codes: H26, I21, J64 Keywords: Tax evasion, underground economy, education, matching, unemployment. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7558 Files in this item: 1
wpec122003.pdf (356.0Kb) -
Dalgaard, Carl-Johan; Schultz, Esben Anton; Sørensen, Anders (Frederiksberg, 2012)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Is the wage gap between majors in human arts and other fields caused by their education per se? If the educational choice is endogenous, the gap may instead be caused by selection. We document that individuals’ educational choice is correlated with that of older students, and argue that it should not influence wages directly. Exploiting this "cohort dependence" as an instrument for educational choice, our 2SLS estimates show that the hourly wage gap is attributable to selection. However, only half of the gap in annual earnings is explained by selection, whereas the other half is due to lower work hours. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8521 Files in this item: 1
dalgaard_schultz_sorensen_2012.pdf (476.2Kb) -
Munch, Jakob Roland; Rose Skaksen, Jan; Malchow-Møller, Nikolaj (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In this paper, we propose and test a novel effect of immigration on the wages of native workers. Existing studies have focused on the wage effects that result from changes in the aggregate labour supply in a competitive labour market. We argue that if labour markets are not fully competitive, the use of immigrants may also affect wage formation at the most disaggregate level – the workplace. Using linked employeremployee data, we find that an increased use of workers from less developed countries has a significantly negative effect on the wages of native workers at the workplace – also when controlling for potential endogeneity of the immigrant share using both fixed effects and IV. Additional evidence suggests that this effect works at least partly through a general effect on the wage norm in the firm of hiring employees with poor outside options (the immigrants). URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7665 Files in this item: 1
wp7-2008.pdf (243.0Kb)