Browsing Working Papers (ECON) by Title
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Urban, Dieter M. (København, 1998)[More information][Less information]
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Hvidt, Morten; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Andersen, Steffen; Harrison, Glenn W.; Hole, Arne Risa; Rutström, E. Elisabet (Frederiksberg, 2010)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We develop an extension of the familiar linear mixed logit model to allow for the direct estimation of parametric non-linear functions defined over structural parameters. A classic application is the estimation of coefficients of utility functions to characterize risk attitudes. There are several unexpected benefits of this extension, apart from the ability to directly estimate structural parameters of theoretical interest. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8171 Files in this item: 1
wp4-2010.pdf (174.4Kb) -
Andersen, Steffen; Harrison, Glenn W.; Hole, Arne Risa; Rutström, E. Elisabet (, 2009)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Experimental data exhibit considerable individual heterogeneity. We review the econometric methods employed to characterize that heterogeneity. We pay particular attention to the trade-off between collecting and allowing for observable characteristics, such as the familiar demographics, and the use of statistical methods to allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity. We demonstrate that these tools are complementary. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7802 Files in this item: 1
wp2009-6.pdf (420.1Kb) -
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Woodland, Alan D. (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper examines the welfare implications of non-discriminatory tariff reforms by a subset of countries, which we term a non-preferential trading club. We show that there exist coordinated tariff reforms, accompanied by appropriate income transfers between the member countries, that unambiguously increase the welfare of these countries while leaving the welfare of non-members unaltered. In terms of economic policy implications, our results show that there exist regional, MFN-consistent arrangements that lead to Pareto improvements in world welfare. JEL code: F15. Keywords: Trading clubs, non-preferential tariff reform, Kemp-Wan-Ohyama proposition. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7540 Files in this item: 1
wpec062004.pdf (262.2Kb) -
Kleis Frederiksen, Niels (København, 1998)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This note discusses the generational incidence of consumption taxes in an OLG framework. The objective is to highlight the channels through which an increase in, e.g., a VAT redistributes income across generations. It turns out that with labor supply exogenous VAT incidence is very similar to the impact of a PAYG pension system or government debt. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7578 Files in this item: 1
1998_5.pdf (925.5Kb) -
Blomgren-Hansen, Niels (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Diamond’s two-period OLG growth model is based on the assumption that the stock of capital in any period is equal to the wealth accumulated in the previous period by the generation of pensioners. This stock equlibrium condition may appear an innocuous paraphrase of the ordinary macro-economic flow equilibrium condition, S = I. This is not the case. In this note I demonstrate that Diamond’s solution is unstable in a monetary market economy where households and firms make independent decisions as to how much to save and how much to invest. An increase in the rate of interest above the Diamond long-run equilibrium level will cause saving to fall by more than investment and, hence, result in excess demand for loanable funds and an upward pressure on the rate of interest. However, substituting the ordinary S = I flow equilibrium condition for Diamonds stock equilibrium condition reveals that the model has another solution - the rate of interest equals the rate of growth - and that this solution is stable in a capital-based economy (contrary to the pure consumption loan model of interest suggested by Samuelson(1958)). The model has interesting implications. Diamond’s model predict that an increase in rate of time preference causing the young generation to save less will reduce the capital stock and raise the rate of interest. However,the S = I based two period OLG model reveals that the old generation’s consumption falls by more than the the young generation’s consumption increases. Consequently, excess supply of loanable funds will drive down the rate of interest. If the rate of interest is equal to the rate of growth an increase in the time preference has no effect on the supply of loanable funds and, consequently, neither on the rate of interest or the stock of capital. Whether people prefer to consume as young or old should not be a matter of public concern (although the transition from one state to another may be). URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7656 Files in this item: 1
wp14-2005.pdf (193.7Kb) -
hvordan får vi mest vækst for pengene?Skaksen, Jan Rose; Kirk, Jens Sand; Stephensen, Peter (Frederiksberg, 2009)[More information][Less information]
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7987 Files in this item: 1
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Blomgren-Hansen, Niels (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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A model of trade with several countries where local integration benefits allHansen, Bodil O.; Keiding, Hans (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: For the study of economic integration, it is costumary to use a three countryworld, where two of the countries may introduce forms of closer economic cooperation. In the present model, we follow this tradition but put special emphasis on the role of credit and entrepreneurship. Our model is of the standard neoclassical type, with the addition that production takes time and is subject to uncertainty. Also, firms must use the financial system in order to buy inputs; the cost of credit may differ among countries and industries, reflecting their basic patterns of uncertainty. Following the Newbery-Stiglitz approach, we show that in such model we may exhibit cases of Pareto inferior trade and, in particular, Pareto inferior economic integration. More specifically, we show that integrating countries of very different economic size may give rise to adverse effects on welfare, whereas integration of countries with a more similar economic structure and size tends to have beneficial effects for the parties. Keywords: trade, uncertainty, Pareto inferior trade, regional integration. JEL classification: F11, F15, F34 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7495 Files in this item: 1
wp4-2005.pdf (124.2Kb) -
a stylished model for Egypt with some numerical policy examplesRisager, Ole; Yang, Chang-Po (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper analyzes the consequences of pursuing a less activist Government employment stabilization policy strategy in Egypt. On the basis of a fairly stylized model we find that a reduction of the Government’s involvement in the economy along with an introduction of mild but binding firing regulations in the private sector may lead to a rise in total employment and to an improvement in Egypt’s trade balance vis-à-vis the rest of the world. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7659 Files in this item: 1
1999_3.pdf (84.99Kb) -
Overgaard Olesen, Jan; Risager, Ole (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Overgaard Olesen, Jan; Risager, Ole (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Veugelers, Reinhilde; Schneider, Cedric (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Recent policy initiatives in the EU aim at supporting so-called Young Innovative Companies (YICs). This paper provides empirical evidence from German CIS data on the innovative performances of this specific type of firms, supporting why they matter. We first characterize YICs in the sample of innovation active firms. We show that firms that combine newness, smallness and high R&D intensity, are rare in the sample of innovative firms, but achieve significantly higher innovative sales than other innovative firms, especially innovative sales that are new to the market. Not surprisingly, YICs view financial constraints, both internal and external, as an important factor hampering their innovation activities, significantly more so than other innovation active firms. This access to finance problem is an often used motive for government intervention. In Germany, subsidies schemes for innovation are general and not particularly targeted at YICs. When assessing the effectiveness of these public funding schemes for our sample firms, we find that they are not effective to increase the innovative sales of YICs, unlike the average innovative firm in our sample. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7663 Files in this item: 1
wp4-2008.pdf (209.8Kb) -
Lund, Lars (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The Greenland infrastructure for the airborne traffic uses Kangerlussuaq, Søndre Strømfjord, as hub. New scenarios may change that, and one possibility is the construction of a large airport at Nuuk with a 3000 m runway. The trunk line will then be between Copenhagen and Nuuk. In that case the village Kangerlussuaq will be abandoned. The paper analyses the size of the economic gain to Greenland of such a change. Using official statistics and information collected for the investigation a description is made of the employment structure and the income earned in the trades represented in Kangerlussuaq. It is then discussed to which extent people do tasks that will still be needed with the new structure and to which extent they will be set free to go into alternative production. The last possibility is regarded as a saving or as an increase in resources for Greenland, and the estimate is that this gain will amount to around 40 percent of the contribution to GDP in Kangerlussuaq. The saving is modified a little by the need of some new investments in Nuuk, mostly for housing. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7507 Files in this item: 1
wp1-2006.pdf (395.9Kb) -
Ghiglino, Christian; Tvede, Mich (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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Sørensen, Anders (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Welfare ranking of policy instruments is addressed in a two-sector Ramsey model with monopoly pricing in one sector as the only distortion. When government spending is restricted, i.e. when a government is unable or unwilling to finance the required costs for implementing the optimum policy, subsidies that directly affect investment incentives may generate higher welfare effects than the direct instrument, which is a production subsidy. The driving mechanism is that an investment subsidy may be more cost effective than the direct instrument; and that the relative welfare gain from cost effectiveness can exceed the welfare loss from introducing new distortions. Moreover, it is found that the investment subsidy is gradually phased out of the welfare maximizing policy, which may be a policy combining the two subsidies, when the level of government spending is increased. Keywords: welfare ranking, indirect and direct policy instruments, restricted government spending JEL: E61, O21, O41 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7581 Files in this item: 1
wp8-2006.pdf (362.5Kb) -
Blomgren-Hansen, Niels (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In most countries labor is organzed in cooperating skill-speci c unions rather than in industrial unions or separately bargaining skill-speci c unions. Within an extremely simple model of a small open economy facing imperfect competition we show that this way of organizing labor can be explained as the outcome of rational (optimizing) behavior on the part of the unions and the employers. Organizing labor in local industrial cartels (regardless of skill) or a single economy wide cartel results in a real wage level that is inappropriately low both from the point of view of labor and the society as a whole unless labor has close to monopoly power in the wage setting process. Organizing labor in local or economy wide skill-speci c unions may result in a wage level that is too high. In addition, a labor market organized in non-cooperating unions is likely to be unstable. This dilemma calls for a compromise: A cartel of cooperating, independent skill-speci c unions. The degree and the form of the cooperation depend inter alia on the bargaining power of the employer, the number of skills and competing rms and the rigidity with which the unions enforce lines of demarcations. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7599 Files in this item: 1
wp3-2008.pdf (467.4Kb) -
Bennedsen, Morten; Schultz, Christian (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
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Evidence from Unexpected Inheritance due to Sudden DeathAndersen, Steffen; Meisner Nielsen, Kasper (Frederiksberg, 2010)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We use a natural experiment to investigate the impact of participation constraints on individuals' decisions to invest in the stock market. Unexpected inheritance due to sudden deaths results in exogenous variation in financial wealth and allows us to examine whether fixed entry and ongoing participation costs cause non-participation. We have three key findings. First, windfall wealth has a positive effect on participation. Second, the majority of households do not react to sizeable windfalls by entering the stock market, but hold on to substantial safe assets—even over longer horizons. Third, the majority of households inheriting stock holdings actively sell the entire portfolio. Overall, these findings suggest that participation by many individuals is unlikely to be constrained by financial participation costs. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8169 Files in this item: 1
wp3-2010.pdf (254.6Kb)