Browsing Working Papers (ECON) by Author "Bogetoft, Peter"
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Staff utilisation in branches of a large Canadian bankAsmild, Mette; Bogetoft, Peter; Hougaard, Jens Leth (, 2011)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In this paper we consider staffing decisions in branches of a large Canadian bank. The bank has well-developed staffing models and the branches work in a highly competitive environment. One would therefore expect limited ’inefficiency’ in the sense of wasted resources and over-staffing. Using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) we nevertheless find considerable ’inefficiency’ which raises the question whether this is best interpreted as waste or if the apparent inefficiency may serve other purposes. To investigate this, we invoke the theoretical framework of Rational Inefficiency (Bogetoft and Hougaard 2003). A systematic pattern of slack consumption emerges, which suggests that the allocation of slack between sta↵ groups is far from random. The slack pattern seems natural from the point of view of employee value and hierarchy and also considering employee flexibility and substitutability. For example we find relatively large over-staffing at the supervisor level which is natural given both their strong bargaining position derived from their role in the branch hierarchy and given the relative flexibility of supervisor resources. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8634 Files in this item: 1
Asmild Bogetoft Hougaard_2011.pdf (567.5Kb) -
An analysis of the proposed Dutch yardstick mechanismBogetoft, Peter; Mikkers, Misja C.; Halbersma, Rein; Agrell, Per J. (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Health care provision is undergoing major reforms in Europe as a reaction to rapidly increasing expenditure and lowered political acceptance to commit public finance to cover the deficits. The Dutch government will decide in 2007 if the current budget system will be replaced by a more competitive mechanism, based on the yardstick regulation principle by Shleifer (1985). One of the proposed systems for the reform can be compared to a revenue-cap implementation of a multi-product cost-yardstick mechanism. The redistribution of the sector’s relevant cost is made in proportion to the individual hospitals share of total weighted output. No regulation is made of the multi-lateral contractual relations between users, insurers and hospitals. The scaling weights are updated periodically for new services and as a function of observed excess demand (waiting lists). The mechanism is shown to provide cost-reducing (effort-inducing) incentives for profit-maximizing rational agents in a single-period bargaining game. The game also shows that the regulation acts as a countervailing power for the insurers to reinforce bargaining power. The local distortion of the output profile induced by the regulation is a function of demand elasticity and cost function convexity. In case the revenue target is not binding, no welfare loss is incurred. The regime also provides incentives for cost-reducing investments in the short and the long run. These incentives manifest themselves in local reallocations of output to more efficient producers. The analysis shows that care should be taken in the updating of the weights as to provide incentives for service innovation, as well as to guarantee convergence of the price system. Although this requires econometric analyses, the alternative with a cost-based yardstick is considered superior to a revenue-based ditto for this application. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7661 Files in this item: 1
wp1-2007-yardstick.pdf (1.159Mb)
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