Browsing Working Papers (ECON) by Author "Boom, Anette"
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Boom, Anette (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper uses an adapted version of the linear tracing procedure, suggested by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), in order to discriminate between two types of multiple Nash equilibria. Equilibria of the same type are pay-off equivalent in the analysed multiple-unit unit price auction where two sellers compete in order to serve a fixed demand. The equilibria where the firm with the larger capacity bids the maximum price, serves the residual demand and is undercut by the low capacity firm that sells its total capacity risk dominate the equilibria where the roles are interchanged. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7664 Files in this item: 1
wp2-2008.pdf (302.0Kb) -
Effects on Capacity Investments, Prices and WelfareBuehler, Stefan; Boom, Anette (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We examine the effects of reorganizing electricity markets on capacity investments, retail prices and welfare when demand is uncertain. We study the following market configurations: (i) integrated monopoly, (ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade, and (iii) separated duopoly with wholesale trade. Assuming that wholesale prices can react to changes in retail prices (but not vice versa), we find that generators install sufficient capacity to serve retail demand in each market configuration, thus avoiding blackouts. Furthermore, aggregate capacity levels and retail prices are such that the separated (integrated) duopoly with wholesale trade performs best (worst) in terms of welfare. Keywords: Electricity, Investments, Generating Capacities, Vertical Integration, Monopoly and Competition. JEL-Classification: D42, D43, D44, L11, L12, L13 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7589 Files in this item: 1
wp11-2006.pdf (286.3Kb) -
Boom, Anette (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We compare investments in generating capacities of an integrated monopolist with the aggregate investments of two vertically integrated competing firms. The firms invest in their capacity and fix the retail price while electricity demand is uncertain. The wholesale price is determined in a unit price auction where the firms know the level of demand when they bid their capacities. Total capacities can be larger or smaller with a duopoly than with a monopoly. If the two firms select the Pareto dominant equilibrium, then the retail price is always higher and the social welfare lower in the duopoly case. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7572 Files in this item: 1
wp3-2007.pdf (552.5Kb)
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