Browsing Working Papers (ECON) by Author "Meisner Nielsen, Kasper"
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Evidence from Survival Rates in a Natural ExperimentAndersen, Steffen; Meisner Nielsen, Kasper (Frederiksberg, 2012)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We use a natural experiment in Denmark to test the hypothesis that aspiring entrepreneurs face financial constraints because of low entrepreneurial quality. We identify 304 constrained entrepreneurs who start a business after receiving windfall wealth and examine the performance of these marginal entrepreneurs. We find that constrained entrepreneurs have significantly lower survival rates and lower profits when compared with a matched sample of unconstrained entrepreneurs. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the marginal entrepreneur is of low quality. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8499 Files in this item: 1
Andersen_MeisnerNielsen.pdf (402.7Kb) -
Bennedsen, Morten; Kongsted, Hans Christian; Meisner Nielsen, Kasper (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Previous work on board size effects in closely held corporations has established a negative correlation between board size and firm performance. We argue that this work has been incomplete in analysing the causal relationship due to lack of ownership information and weak identification strategies in simultanous equation analysis. In the present paper we reexamine the causal relationship between board size and firm performance using a dataset of more than 5,000 small and medium sized closely held corporations with complete ownership information and detailed accounting data. We test the potential endogeneity of board size by using a new instrument given by the number of children of the founders of the firms. Our analysis shows that board size can be taken as exogenous in the performance equation. Furthermore, based on a flexible model specification we find that there is no empirical evidence of adverse board size effects in the typical range of three to six board members. Finally, we find a significantly negative board size effect in the minority of closely held firms which have comparatively large boards of seven or more members. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7566 Files in this item: 1
wpec092004.pdf (252.8Kb) -
Kongsted, Hans Christian; Meisner Nielsen, Kasper; Bennedsen, Morten (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Boards are endogenously chosen institutions determined by observable and unobservable firm characteristics. Empirical studies of large publicly traded firms have successfully controlled for observable determinants of board size and shown a robust negative relationship between board size and firm performance. The evidence on smaller closely held firms is less clear; we argue that existing work has been incomplete in analyzing the causal relationship due to weak identification strategies. Using a rich data set of almost 6,000 small and medium-sized closely held corporations we provide a causal analysis of board size effects on firm performance using a novel instrument given by the number of children of the founders of the firms. First, we find no empirical evidence of adverse board size effects when the size of the board lies in the typical range for closely held corporations of three to six directors. Second, we find a significantly negative board size effect for the minority of closely held firms that are characterized by having comparatively large boards of seven or more members and non-complex operations. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7600 Files in this item: 1
wp14-2007.pdf (428.8Kb) -
Evidence from Unexpected Inheritance due to Sudden DeathAndersen, Steffen; Meisner Nielsen, Kasper (Frederiksberg, 2010)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We use a natural experiment to investigate the impact of participation constraints on individuals' decisions to invest in the stock market. Unexpected inheritance due to sudden deaths results in exogenous variation in financial wealth and allows us to examine whether fixed entry and ongoing participation costs cause non-participation. We have three key findings. First, windfall wealth has a positive effect on participation. Second, the majority of households do not react to sizeable windfalls by entering the stock market, but hold on to substantial safe assets—even over longer horizons. Third, the majority of households inheriting stock holdings actively sell the entire portfolio. Overall, these findings suggest that participation by many individuals is unlikely to be constrained by financial participation costs. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8169 Files in this item: 1
wp3-2010.pdf (254.6Kb) -
Separating the Impact of Dual Class Shares, Pyramids and Cross-ownership on Firm Value Across Legal Regimes in Western EuropeBennedsen, Morten; Meisner Nielsen, Kasper (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Recent policy initiatives within the harmonization of European company laws have promoted a so-called "principle of proportionality" through proposals that regulate mechanisms opposing a proportional distribution of ownership and control. We scrutinize the foundation for these initiatives by analyzing the use of instruments to separate ownership from control across legal regimes in a sample of over 4,000 publicly traded firms from 14 Western European countries. First, we confirm the negative impact on firm value from disproportional ownership structures previously established in a sample of Asian firms by Claessens et al. (2002). Second, we show that dual class shares have a larger and more significant negative effect on firm value than pyramids and cross holdings. Third, we find that the impact of disproportionality and the underlying instruments is inversely related to the level of investor protection. Thus, dual class shares and pyramids substitute legal protection in countries with inadequate investor protection. Fourth, we find no evidence of a significant effect of disproportionality instruments on earnings performance. Finally, we discuss policy implications of these findings in relationship to the process of harmonization of the European capital markets. JEL classifications: G30, G32, G34 and G38 Keywords: Ownership Structure, Dual Class Shares, Pyramids, EU company laws. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7544 Files in this item: 1
wp22-2005.pdf (414.4Kb)
Now showing items 1-5 of 5