Browsing Working Papers (ECON) by Author "Nielsen, Søren Bo"
Now showing items 1-15 of 15
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Fuest, Clemens; Huber, Bernd; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Recent years have seen large swings in house prices in many countries. Motivated by housing price variations, proposals for taxing capital gains on housing have repeatedly been put forth. The idea seems to be that such taxes would curb the redistribution occurring between those owning houses and those trying to get into the market for owner-occupied housing. Our paper shows that at least in simple settings, a tax on real capital gains on housing will only lead to even bigger price swings and will not be able to redistribute between people appearing on either side of the housing market. Keywords: capital gains tax, housing market, price fluctuations JEL-Classification: H23, H24, R 31. Addresses: URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7640 Files in this item: 1
wpec162004.pdf (178.3Kb) -
Huizinga, Harry; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Europe has seen several proposals for tax coordination only in the area of capital income taxation, leaving countries free to adjust their labor taxes. The expectation is that higher capital income tax revenues would cause countries to reduce their labor taxes. This paper shows that such changes in the mix of capital and labor taxes brought on by capital income tax coordination can potentially be welfare reducing. This reflects that in a non-cooperative equilibrium capital income taxes may be more distorting from an international perspective than are labor income taxes. Simulations with a simple model calibrated to EU public finance data suggest that countries indeed lower their labor taxes in response to higher coordinated capital income taxes. The overall welfare effects of capital income tax coordination, however, are estimated to remain positive. JEL Classification: F20, H87 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7582 Files in this item: 1
wp24-2005.pdf (343.7Kb) -
Nielsen, Søren Bo; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise's choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs – here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument –, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large. Keywords: Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions, taxes, MNEs. JEL-Classification: H25, F23, L23. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7652 Files in this item: 1
wp10-2005.pdf (164.5Kb) -
Nielsen, Søren Bo; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Nielsen, Søren Bo; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Munich, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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Huizinga, Harry; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Internationalization offers enhanced opportunities for individuals to place savings abroad and evade domestic saving taxation. This paper asks whether the concomi- tant loss of saving taxation necessarily is harmful. To this end we construct a model of many symmetric countries in which public goods are financed by taxes on saving and investment. There is international cross-ownership of firms, and countries are assumed to be unable to tax away pure profits. Countries then face an incentive to impose a rather high investment tax also borne by foreigners. In this setting, the loss of the saving tax instrument on account of international tax evasion may prevent the overall saving-investment tax wedge from becoming too high, and hence may be beneficial for moderate preferences for public goods. A world with 'high- spending' governments, in contrast, is made worse off by the loss of saving taxes, and hence stands to gain from international cooperation to restore saving taxation. JEL-Classifcation: H87, H21 Keywords: Capital income taxation, cross-ownership, coordination URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7535 Files in this item: 1
wpec152004.pdf (172.2Kb) -
Hvidt, Morten; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper proposes and analyses a model of start-up investment. Innovative entrepreneurs are commercially inexperienced and can benefit from venture capital support. Only part of them succeed in matching with a venture capitalist while the rest must resort to standard bank finance. We consider a number of policies to promote entrepreneurship and venture capital backed innovation. JEL Classification: D82, G24, G28, H24. Keywords: venture capital bank finance, matching, moral hazard, public policy. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7658 Files in this item: 1
cesifo working paper no. 850.pdf (392.7Kb) -
Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In recent years, venture capital has become an important source for nancing young entrepreneurial rms. Given the apparently more innovative nature and extra value added of venture capital backed rms compared to other firms, policy makers have taken an increasing interest in an active venture capital industry. We explore how selected policy instruments determine the incentives of individuals to start up new rms and of venture capitalists to nance and advise them, and how policy thereby influences the size and nature of the industry and how it aspects aggregate welfare. We examine the impact of wage and corporate income taxes as well as capital gains taxes and start-up capital subsidies on the volume and quality of venture capital backed entrepreneurship. JEL-Classi cation: D82, G24, H24, H25 Keywords: Entrepreneurship, venture capital, double moral hazard, taxes, sub-sidies. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7569 Files in this item: 1
wp15-06.pdf (291.5Kb) -
Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 1998)[More information][Less information]
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Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In recent years, venture capital has increasingly become a factor in the financing of new firms. We examine how the value of mature firms determines the incentives of entrepreneurs to start up new firms and of venture capitalists to finance and advise them. We examine how capital gains taxes as well as subsidies to start-up costs of new firms affect venture capital-backed entrepreneurship. We also argue that dividend and capital gains taxes on mature firms have important consequences for start-up firms as well. JEL Classification: D82, G24, H24 and H25 Keywords: double moral hazard, entrepreneurship, taxes and venture capital URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7592 Files in this item: 1
cepr nr. 4097.pdf (464.2Kb) -
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We examine how a multinational’s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure is affected by country tax differentials. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs — here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument —, we show that decentralization is preferred in case of small tax differentials, whereas centralization can be more profitable, when tax differentials are large. In essence, the organizational flexibility of MNEs is triggered by the scope for tax minimization. Our analysis allows for both commitment and non-commitment to transfer prices, and for alternative modes of competition. Keywords: Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions, taxes, transfer prices, MNEs. JEL-Classification: H25, F23, L23. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7509 Files in this item: 1
wp7-2006.pdf (234.3Kb) -
GreenlandVesterø Jensen, Carsten; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper provides an assessment of Greenland's tax system and contemplates changes that may be undertaken in the future to prepare for greater economic self-reliance and for the country's participation in the wider world economy. At the outskirts of Europe, Greenland is an autonomous part of the Danish kingdom, though currently not a member of EU. However, its cooperation with European countries and its dependency on international trade renders it necessary for the tax system in Greenland to be attuned to developments in the rest of the world. Drawing on a thorough international benchmarking analysis of Greenland's tax system, the paper's special focus will be on the corporate tax system and its interplay with personal taxation, as well on as the system of import duties. In particular, we carry out computations of effective marginal and average corporate tax rates, as well as average effective tax burdens on consumption, labour income and capital income, and compare these to similar measures for EU countries. In addition, we outline how Greenland's economic policy in other areas interferes with tax policy. Especially fishery regulation, management of government-owned companies, and housing policy have major implications for the tax system. Key words: international benchmarking, effective tax rates, Greenland JEL: H20, H25 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7595 Files in this item: 1
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Nielsen, Søren Bo; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
Now showing items 1-15 of 15