Browsing Department of Economics (ECON) by Title
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Blomgren-Hansen, Niels (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Diamond’s two-period OLG growth model is based on the assumption that the stock of capital in any period is equal to the wealth accumulated in the previous period by the generation of pensioners. This stock equlibrium condition may appear an innocuous paraphrase of the ordinary macro-economic flow equilibrium condition, S = I. This is not the case. In this note I demonstrate that Diamond’s solution is unstable in a monetary market economy where households and firms make independent decisions as to how much to save and how much to invest. An increase in the rate of interest above the Diamond long-run equilibrium level will cause saving to fall by more than investment and, hence, result in excess demand for loanable funds and an upward pressure on the rate of interest. However, substituting the ordinary S = I flow equilibrium condition for Diamonds stock equilibrium condition reveals that the model has another solution - the rate of interest equals the rate of growth - and that this solution is stable in a capital-based economy (contrary to the pure consumption loan model of interest suggested by Samuelson(1958)). The model has interesting implications. Diamond’s model predict that an increase in rate of time preference causing the young generation to save less will reduce the capital stock and raise the rate of interest. However,the S = I based two period OLG model reveals that the old generation’s consumption falls by more than the the young generation’s consumption increases. Consequently, excess supply of loanable funds will drive down the rate of interest. If the rate of interest is equal to the rate of growth an increase in the time preference has no effect on the supply of loanable funds and, consequently, neither on the rate of interest or the stock of capital. Whether people prefer to consume as young or old should not be a matter of public concern (although the transition from one state to another may be). URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7656 Files in this item: 1
wp14-2005.pdf (193.7Kb) -
hvordan får vi mest vækst for pengene?Skaksen, Jan Rose; Kirk, Jens Sand; Stephensen, Peter (Frederiksberg, 2009)[More information][Less information]
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7987 Files in this item: 1
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Blomgren-Hansen, Niels (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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A model of trade with several countries where local integration benefits allHansen, Bodil O.; Keiding, Hans (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: For the study of economic integration, it is costumary to use a three countryworld, where two of the countries may introduce forms of closer economic cooperation. In the present model, we follow this tradition but put special emphasis on the role of credit and entrepreneurship. Our model is of the standard neoclassical type, with the addition that production takes time and is subject to uncertainty. Also, firms must use the financial system in order to buy inputs; the cost of credit may differ among countries and industries, reflecting their basic patterns of uncertainty. Following the Newbery-Stiglitz approach, we show that in such model we may exhibit cases of Pareto inferior trade and, in particular, Pareto inferior economic integration. More specifically, we show that integrating countries of very different economic size may give rise to adverse effects on welfare, whereas integration of countries with a more similar economic structure and size tends to have beneficial effects for the parties. Keywords: trade, uncertainty, Pareto inferior trade, regional integration. JEL classification: F11, F15, F34 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7495 Files in this item: 1
wp4-2005.pdf (124.2Kb) -
a stylished model for Egypt with some numerical policy examplesRisager, Ole; Yang, Chang-Po (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper analyzes the consequences of pursuing a less activist Government employment stabilization policy strategy in Egypt. On the basis of a fairly stylized model we find that a reduction of the Government’s involvement in the economy along with an introduction of mild but binding firing regulations in the private sector may lead to a rise in total employment and to an improvement in Egypt’s trade balance vis-à-vis the rest of the world. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7659 Files in this item: 1
1999_3.pdf (84.99Kb) -
Overgaard Olesen, Jan; Risager, Ole (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Overgaard Olesen, Jan; Risager, Ole (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Veugelers, Reinhilde; Schneider, Cedric (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Recent policy initiatives in the EU aim at supporting so-called Young Innovative Companies (YICs). This paper provides empirical evidence from German CIS data on the innovative performances of this specific type of firms, supporting why they matter. We first characterize YICs in the sample of innovation active firms. We show that firms that combine newness, smallness and high R&D intensity, are rare in the sample of innovative firms, but achieve significantly higher innovative sales than other innovative firms, especially innovative sales that are new to the market. Not surprisingly, YICs view financial constraints, both internal and external, as an important factor hampering their innovation activities, significantly more so than other innovation active firms. This access to finance problem is an often used motive for government intervention. In Germany, subsidies schemes for innovation are general and not particularly targeted at YICs. When assessing the effectiveness of these public funding schemes for our sample firms, we find that they are not effective to increase the innovative sales of YICs, unlike the average innovative firm in our sample. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7663 Files in this item: 1
wp4-2008.pdf (209.8Kb) -
Lund, Lars (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The Greenland infrastructure for the airborne traffic uses Kangerlussuaq, Søndre Strømfjord, as hub. New scenarios may change that, and one possibility is the construction of a large airport at Nuuk with a 3000 m runway. The trunk line will then be between Copenhagen and Nuuk. In that case the village Kangerlussuaq will be abandoned. The paper analyses the size of the economic gain to Greenland of such a change. Using official statistics and information collected for the investigation a description is made of the employment structure and the income earned in the trades represented in Kangerlussuaq. It is then discussed to which extent people do tasks that will still be needed with the new structure and to which extent they will be set free to go into alternative production. The last possibility is regarded as a saving or as an increase in resources for Greenland, and the estimate is that this gain will amount to around 40 percent of the contribution to GDP in Kangerlussuaq. The saving is modified a little by the need of some new investments in Nuuk, mostly for housing. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7507 Files in this item: 1
wp1-2006.pdf (395.9Kb) -
Ghiglino, Christian; Tvede, Mich (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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Sørensen, Anders (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Welfare ranking of policy instruments is addressed in a two-sector Ramsey model with monopoly pricing in one sector as the only distortion. When government spending is restricted, i.e. when a government is unable or unwilling to finance the required costs for implementing the optimum policy, subsidies that directly affect investment incentives may generate higher welfare effects than the direct instrument, which is a production subsidy. The driving mechanism is that an investment subsidy may be more cost effective than the direct instrument; and that the relative welfare gain from cost effectiveness can exceed the welfare loss from introducing new distortions. Moreover, it is found that the investment subsidy is gradually phased out of the welfare maximizing policy, which may be a policy combining the two subsidies, when the level of government spending is increased. Keywords: welfare ranking, indirect and direct policy instruments, restricted government spending JEL: E61, O21, O41 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7581 Files in this item: 1
wp8-2006.pdf (362.5Kb) -
Blomgren-Hansen, Niels (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In most countries labor is organzed in cooperating skill-speci c unions rather than in industrial unions or separately bargaining skill-speci c unions. Within an extremely simple model of a small open economy facing imperfect competition we show that this way of organizing labor can be explained as the outcome of rational (optimizing) behavior on the part of the unions and the employers. Organizing labor in local industrial cartels (regardless of skill) or a single economy wide cartel results in a real wage level that is inappropriately low both from the point of view of labor and the society as a whole unless labor has close to monopoly power in the wage setting process. Organizing labor in local or economy wide skill-speci c unions may result in a wage level that is too high. In addition, a labor market organized in non-cooperating unions is likely to be unstable. This dilemma calls for a compromise: A cartel of cooperating, independent skill-speci c unions. The degree and the form of the cooperation depend inter alia on the bargaining power of the employer, the number of skills and competing rms and the rigidity with which the unions enforce lines of demarcations. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7599 Files in this item: 1
wp3-2008.pdf (467.4Kb) -
Bennedsen, Morten; Schultz, Christian (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
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Evidence from Unexpected Inheritance due to Sudden DeathAndersen, Steffen; Meisner Nielsen, Kasper (Frederiksberg, 2010)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We use a natural experiment to investigate the impact of participation constraints on individuals' decisions to invest in the stock market. Unexpected inheritance due to sudden deaths results in exogenous variation in financial wealth and allows us to examine whether fixed entry and ongoing participation costs cause non-participation. We have three key findings. First, windfall wealth has a positive effect on participation. Second, the majority of households do not react to sizeable windfalls by entering the stock market, but hold on to substantial safe assets—even over longer horizons. Third, the majority of households inheriting stock holdings actively sell the entire portfolio. Overall, these findings suggest that participation by many individuals is unlikely to be constrained by financial participation costs. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8169 Files in this item: 1
wp3-2010.pdf (254.6Kb) -
Bennedsen, Morten (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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Mayer, Wolfgang; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Why do donor countries give foreign aid? The answers found in the literature are: (i) because donor countries care for recipient countries (e.g. altruism), and/or (ii) because there exist distortions that make the indirect gains from foreign aid (e.g. terms of trade effects) to be larger than the direct losses. This paper proposes a third answer to the above question, namely that aid is determined through the domestic political process of the donor country. The paper demonstrates how foreign aid affects the donor country’s income distribution and how, in a direct democracy, the majority of voters might benefit from foreign aid giving even though the country’s social welfare is reduced. JEL Classification: F35 Keywords: foreign aid, politics, majority voting. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7488 Files in this item: 1
1999_4.pdf (89.81Kb) -
Risager, Ole (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Price-earnings ratios are part of the toolkit that is used for assessing the valuation of individual firms on the stock market as well as the entire market itself. This paper presents consistent P/E series for the liquid Danish shares adjusted for share buybacks. The results show that over the period from 1969 to 2003, the average (trailing) P/E equals 13.5. The P/E reaches its lowest level in 1980, which is likely to be due to a soaring oil price, high wage increases and interest rates approaching 20 percent. Notwithstanding optimistic equity pricing also in Denmark in the late 1990s, the upturn in Danish valuations was more moderate than in the US. The correction that sets in subsequently reversed essentially the gains in the Danish P/E in the 1990s. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7620 Files in this item: 1
wpec132004.pdf (395.4Kb) -
Separating the Impact of Dual Class Shares, Pyramids and Cross-ownership on Firm Value Across Legal Regimes in Western EuropeBennedsen, Morten; Meisner Nielsen, Kasper (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Recent policy initiatives within the harmonization of European company laws have promoted a so-called "principle of proportionality" through proposals that regulate mechanisms opposing a proportional distribution of ownership and control. We scrutinize the foundation for these initiatives by analyzing the use of instruments to separate ownership from control across legal regimes in a sample of over 4,000 publicly traded firms from 14 Western European countries. First, we confirm the negative impact on firm value from disproportional ownership structures previously established in a sample of Asian firms by Claessens et al. (2002). Second, we show that dual class shares have a larger and more significant negative effect on firm value than pyramids and cross holdings. Third, we find that the impact of disproportionality and the underlying instruments is inversely related to the level of investor protection. Thus, dual class shares and pyramids substitute legal protection in countries with inadequate investor protection. Fourth, we find no evidence of a significant effect of disproportionality instruments on earnings performance. Finally, we discuss policy implications of these findings in relationship to the process of harmonization of the European capital markets. JEL classifications: G30, G32, G34 and G38 Keywords: Ownership Structure, Dual Class Shares, Pyramids, EU company laws. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7544 Files in this item: 1
wp22-2005.pdf (414.4Kb) -
Blomgren-Hansen, Niels (København, 1998)[More information][Less information]
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Lund, Lars (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Abstract: The balance of payments of Greenland has special features due to an important current transfer, bloktilskud, from Denmark. The trade balance does not exhibit a deficit of this order of magnitude but comparison of the bloktilskud and the deficit is difficult as official figures are available for the merchandise trade only. Figures for services are missing. However, guesses about the size of a deficit in the services’ trade do not easily discard the impression of a large surplus on the current account. Over a ten year period it is suggested that accumulated surpluses could be twice the level of Greenland’s GDP. This seems unlikely, but the available data raise a puzzle that ought to be addressed as it nourishes suspicion of unobserved accumulation of wealth. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7550 Files in this item: 1
wpec052003.pdf (304.0Kb)