Browsing Department of Economics (ECON) by Title
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Huizinga, Harry; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Europe has seen several proposals for tax coordination only in the area of capital income taxation, leaving countries free to adjust their labor taxes. The expectation is that higher capital income tax revenues would cause countries to reduce their labor taxes. This paper shows that such changes in the mix of capital and labor taxes brought on by capital income tax coordination can potentially be welfare reducing. This reflects that in a non-cooperative equilibrium capital income taxes may be more distorting from an international perspective than are labor income taxes. Simulations with a simple model calibrated to EU public finance data suggest that countries indeed lower their labor taxes in response to higher coordinated capital income taxes. The overall welfare effects of capital income tax coordination, however, are estimated to remain positive. JEL Classification: F20, H87 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7582 Files in this item: 1
wp24-2005.pdf (343.7Kb) -
Inference from the Business CycleRose Skaksen, Jan; Sørensen, Anders (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The relative demand for skills has increased considerably in many OECD countries during recent decades. This development is potentially explained by capital-skill complementarity and high growth rates of capital equipment. When production functions are characterized by capital-skill complementarity, relative wages and employment of skilled labor are countercyclical because capital equipment is a quasi- fixed factor in the short run. The exact behavior of the two variables depends on relative wage flexibility. Relative wages are rigid in Denmark, implying that the employment share of skills should be countercyclical. The labor market is competitive in the United States and therefore relative wages of skilled labor are expected to be countercyclical. We find that the business cycle development of the two economies is consistent with capital-skill complementarity. Keywords: capital-skill complementarity, relative wages, business cycle URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7537 Files in this item: 1
wpec102004.pdf (313.9Kb) -
Berg, Petter (Frederiksberg, 2012)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: During the last ten years there has been a rigorous debate on how to improve anti-cartel enforcement in Europe. Introducing private enforcements systems, like in the US, was early in the process regarded as one of the most important steps for significant improvements. In contrast to public enforcement, private enforcement relies on adequate compensation to customers harmed by a cartel. But cartel damages are hard to calculate and the European Commission has therefore presented a draft guideline on how to quantify harm to assist courts and claimants. The focus in the guidance is on price effects, but cartels are also likely to cause other types of damage, such as efficiency effects. For example, a Swedish committee investigating cartels in the 1950’s stated that ”A monopolist or a cartel can charge too high prices in relation to its costs. A cartel determines prices after the least efficient firm in the cartel, and hence protects it” (SOU 1951:27). This statement reflects an early awareness that pricing and efficiency effects from cartels are deeply related, and jointly determines the harm for consumers. This thesis aims at re-joining the discussion of cartel prices and efficiencies for the purpose of determining cartel damages. It will focus on the issue outlined above, i.e. cartel behaviour and the harm caused by cartels when a cartel consists of members that are not symmetric in costs. Cost asymmetries can be both exogenous and endogenous to cartel formation, but rather than discussing why asymmetries arise, I will in the four chapters focus on the effect the asymmetries have on cartel prices and hence consumer harm. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8407 Files in this item: 1
Petter_Berg.pdf (1.385Mb) -
Kongsted, Hans Christian; Meisner Nielsen, Kasper; Bennedsen, Morten (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Boards are endogenously chosen institutions determined by observable and unobservable firm characteristics. Empirical studies of large publicly traded firms have successfully controlled for observable determinants of board size and shown a robust negative relationship between board size and firm performance. The evidence on smaller closely held firms is less clear; we argue that existing work has been incomplete in analyzing the causal relationship due to weak identification strategies. Using a rich data set of almost 6,000 small and medium-sized closely held corporations we provide a causal analysis of board size effects on firm performance using a novel instrument given by the number of children of the founders of the firms. First, we find no empirical evidence of adverse board size effects when the size of the board lies in the typical range for closely held corporations of three to six directors. Second, we find a significantly negative board size effect for the minority of closely held firms that are characterized by having comparatively large boards of seven or more members and non-complex operations. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7600 Files in this item: 1
wp14-2007.pdf (428.8Kb) -
Nielsen, Søren Bo; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise's choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs – here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument –, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large. Keywords: Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions, taxes, MNEs. JEL-Classification: H25, F23, L23. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7652 Files in this item: 1
wp10-2005.pdf (164.5Kb) -
Hussinger, Katrin; Schneider, Cedric; Czarnitzki, Dirk (København, 2008)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The knowledge produced by academic scientists has been identified as a potential key driver of technological progress. Recent policies in Europe aim at increasing commercially orientated activities in academe. Based on a sample of German scientists across all fields of science we investigate the importance of academic patenting. Our findings suggest that academic involvement in patenting results in greater knowledge externalities, as academic patents appear to generate more forward citations. We also find that in the European context of changing research objectives and funding sources since the mid-90’s, the "importance” of academic patents declines over time. We show that academic entrants have patents of lower "quality” than academic incumbents but they did not cause the decline, since the relative importance of patents involving academics with an existing patenting history declined over time as well. Moreover, a preliminary evaluation of the effects of the abolishment of the "professor privilege” (the German counterpart of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act) reveals that this legal disposition led to an acceleration of this apparent decline. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7666 Files in this item: 1
wp5-2008.pdf (305.8Kb) -
Schmitt, Nicolas; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We examine the interaction between commodity taxes and parallel imports in a simple two-country model with imperfect competition. While governments determine non-cooperatively their commodity tax rate, the volume of parallel imports is determined endogenously by the retailing sector. We compare the positive and normative implications of having commodity taxes based on destination or origin principle. Origin taxes are shown to have very attractive properties: they lead to lower levels of optimal taxes, they converge as parallel imports increase (while destination taxes diverge), and they lead to higher welfare levels. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7538 Files in this item: 1
wp.04.07.pdf (360.3Kb) -
limits to competition policy harmonisation in EU enlargementLorentzen, Jochen; Møllgaard, Peter (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Tvede, Mich; Olai Hansen, Bodil (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings just before the transfer window closes in european soccer. competition between sports clubs, dimension of quality of players, equilibrium in pure strategies, equilibrium in mixed strategies. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7555 Files in this item: 1
wp10-2007.pdf (380.2Kb) -
Møllgaard, Peter; Kastberg Nielsen, Claus (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
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Baghdasaryan, Delia; la Cour, Lisbeth (København, 2009)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This study empirically investigates if competition’s impact on firm performance depends on the ownership structure. Our results show that an increase in import competition has a positive effect on firms with concentrated ownership and a negative effect on firms with dispersed ownership, regardless of the level of domestic competition. Given that the optimal level of ownership concentration with respect to firm productivity is high (low) if tariffs are low (high) in the case when import competition is high these results are consistent with theoretical findings that competition has positive effects in companies that are a priori efficient but not in unproductive firms. If tariffs are high, however, they support inferences based on the x-inefficiency literature. Contrary to what has been suggested by some theoretical results, the riskiness of a firm’s environment does not seem to influence our results. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7660 Files in this item: 1
wp1-2009.pdf (296.5Kb) -
Møllgaard, Peter; Lorentzen, Jo (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We briefly review the rationale behind technological alliances and provide a snapshot of their role in global competition, especially insofar as it is based around intellectual capital. They nicely illustrate the increased importance of horizontal agreements and thus establish the relevance of the topic. We move on to discuss the organisation of industries in a dynamic context and draw out consequences for competition policy. We conclude with an outlook on the underlying tensions between technology alliances, competition policy, and industrial policy. JEL codes: L4, L5, O31 Keywords: Competition policy, innovation, alliances, industrial policy URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7635 Files in this item: 1
wp9-2005.pdf (194.6Kb) -
la Cour, Lisbeth Funding (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Kreickemeier, Udo (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We show that the standard concertina result for tariff reforms – i.e. lowering the highest tariff increases welfare – no longer holds in general if we allow for international capital mobility. The result can break down if the good whose tariff is lowered is not capital intensive. If the concertina reform lowers welfare it lowers market access as well, thereby compromising a second goal that is typically connected with trade liberalisation. JEL-Classification: F11, F13, F15 Key words: Trade Policy Reform, International Factor Mobility, Welfare, Market Access URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7637 Files in this item: 1
wp5-2006.pdf (157.8Kb) -
Bennedsen, Morten; Fosgerau, Mogens; Wolfenzon, Daniel (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Webber, Stuart (Frederiksberg, 2012)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This dissertation analyzes ways in which Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) shift profits from one country to another to reduce their income tax expense. This is an important topic for a number of reasons. From a country’s perspective, its income tax rates and policies can have a significant impact upon its tax revenue, economic competitiveness, and the vibrancy of its economy. From the MNE’s perspective, income tax rates and policies determine a firm’s tax obligations, and thus affect net income and enterprise value. The dissertation examines several ways in which MNEs shift profits to reduce income taxes, and consists of five chapters. The introductory chapter reviews the economic evidence demonstrating firms shift profits from one country to another in response to tax rates. In the past two decades a number of economic studies have shown firms use tax and accounting techniques to shift reported profits to low tax jurisdictions, and that chapter reviews key articles that have demonstrated this. The second paper explains how MNEs finance international investments to shift interest income to low-tax jurisdictions. It reviews government tax policies in a number of countries that have been enacted to limit interest income shifting, and recommends an approach to control this activity. The third paper examines tax efficient supply chains, in which tax departments and supply chain organizations collaborate to site business operations to achieve supply chain objectives and reduce tax obligations. The fourth chapter analyzes how some U.S.-headquartered firms have moved their corporate headquarters from the U.S. to tax havens, to reduce their tax expense and avoid U.S. international tax policies. The fifth and final chapter examines new U.S. tax regulations that propose to value intellectual property transfers in the same way outside investors would, which the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) calls its “investor model.” It also makes recommendations concerning how the investor model can be improved. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8457 Files in this item: 1
Stuart_Webber.pdf (1.230Mb) -
Marker-Larsen, Svend (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
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Marker-Larsen, Svend (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: De i denne fremstilling omtalte problemstillinger blev kun ganske kort præsenteret i min oversigtsartikel om "Cost-Benefit Analysens Velfærdsteoretiske Basis" (2005). Det blev deri præciseret, at identifikationsproblemet drejede sig om: Præcis hvilke effekter, der i det hele taget skal medregnes som samfundsøkonomiske fordele og ulemper, hvis analysen skal være fuldstændig og at vurderingsproblemet så drejede sig om spørgsmålet: Hvilke priser, der skal anvendes i forbindelse med værdisætningen af fordele og ulemper. Endvidere blev der givet en summarisk oversigt over en række situationer, hvor man må kunne bruge de aktuelle eller forventede markedspriser, når fordele og ulemper skal værdisættes. I det følgende gives først en mere udførlig redegørelse for nogle af de helt centrale ræsonnementer vedrørende vurderingsproblemet. Sidenhen fører det forholdsvis logisk frem til, at også identifikationsproblemet i en række væsentlige henseender bliver yderligere belyst. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7641 Files in this item: 1
wp7-2005.pdf (1.579Mb) -
Hviid, Morten; Møllgård, Peter (Norwich, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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On the Dynamics of Competitive ScreeningLund, Diderik; Nilssen, Tore (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Abstract We discuss the existence of a pooling equilibrium in a two-period model of an insurance market with asymmetric information. We solve the model numerically. We pay particular attention to the reasons for non-existence in cases where no pooling equilibrium exists. In addition to the phenom- enon of cream skimming emphasized in earlier literature, we here point to the the importance of the opposite: dregs skimming, whereby high-risk consumers are proÞtably detracted from the candidate pooling contract. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7596 Files in this item: 1
wpec012003.pdf (380.8Kb)