Browsing Department of Economics (ECON) by Title
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Kennes, John; Tranæs, Torben; Larsen, Birthe; Filges, Trine (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We find that the main featues of labor policy across OECD countries can be explained by a simple general equilibrium search model with risk neutral agents and a government that chooses policy to maximize a social welfare function. In equilibrum, policies are chosen to optimal redistribute income from advantaged to disadvantaged workers. A worker can be disadvantaged in the sense that they may have less ability to aquire and utilize skills in the workplace. The model explains why passive benefits tend to fall and active benefits tend to increase during the course of unemployment spell. The model also explains why countries that appear to pursue equity spend more on both active and passive labor market programs. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7648 Files in this item: 1
wp13-06.pdf (197.7Kb) -
Munch, Jakob Roland; Rose Skaksen, Jan (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper studies the impact of outsourcing on individual wages. In contrast to the standard approach in the literature, we focus on domestic outsourcing as well as foreign outsourcing. By using a simple theoretical model, we argue that, if outsourcing is associated with specialization gains arising from an increase in the extent of the market for intermediate goods, domestic outsourcing tends to increase wages for both unskilled and skilled labor. We use a panel data set of workers in Danish manufacturing industries to show that domestic and foreign outsurcing affect wages as predicted by the theory. Keywords: Outsourcing, Comparative advantage, Specialization, Wages. JEL Classification: F16, J31, C23. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7522 Files in this item: 1
wp19-2005.pdf (316.0Kb) -
Andersen, Steffen; Ertaç, Seda; Gneezy, Uri; Hoffman, Moshe; List, John A. (Frederiksberg, 2011)[More information][Less information]
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Woodland, Alan D.; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper introduces the concept of a steepest ascent tariff reform for a small open economy. By construction, it is locally optimal in that it yields the highest gain in utility of any feasible tariff reform vector of the same length. Accordingly, it provides a convenient benchmark for the evaluation of the welfare effectiveness of other well known tariff reform rules, as e.g. the proportional and the concertina rules. We develop the properties of this tariff reform, characterize the sources of the potential welfare gains from tariff reform, use it to establish conditions under which some existing reforms are locally optimal, provide geometric illustrations and compare welfare effectiveness of reforms using numerical examples. Moreover, being a general concept, we apply it to the issue of market access and examine its implications. Overall, the paper’s contribution lies in presenting a theoretical concept where the focus is upon the size of welfare gains accruing from tariff reforms rather than simply with the direction of welfare effects that has been the concern of the literature. JEL code: F15. Keywords: Steepest ascent tariff reforms; piecemeal tariff policy; welfare; market access; small open economy. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7565 Files in this item: 1
wp4-2006.pdf (393.9Kb) -
Filges, Trine; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper examines the macroeconomic effects of youth unemployment programmes in the form of vocational training (YUPs), developing a two sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-fi rm wage bargaining for skilled workers. Unskilled sector wages are indexed to skilled sector wages. Workers differ with respect to ability, having importance for the young worker s skill decision. Furthermore, a young worker may be offered vocational training through YUPs. The total number of skilled workers is therefore determined by these two channels and the interaction between them. We focus on the impact of of YUPs on skill division, unemployment distribution workers and aggregate unemployment. Keywords: Skill acquisition, search, JEL classi cations: J18 J38 J68 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7601 Files in this item: 1
wpec092001.pdf (415.6Kb) -
Nielsen, Steen; Risager, Ole (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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evidence from a cointegration analysis for DenmarkOvergaard Olesen, Jan (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Blomgren-Hansen, Niels (København, 1999)[More information][Less information]
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effekter af at harmonisere selskabslovgivningen i EUBennedsen, Morten; Nielsen, Kasper (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Lund, Diderik (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Abstract Lund (2002a) showed in a CAPM-type model how tax depreciation schedules affect required expected returns after taxes. Even without leverage higher tax rates implied lower betas when tax deductions were risk free. Here they are risky, and marginal investment is taxed together with inframarginal in an analytical model of decreasing returns. With imperfect loss offset tax claims are analogous to call options. The beta of equity is still decreasing in the tax rate, but increasing in the underlying volatility. The results are important if market data are used to infer required expected returns, and in discussions of tax design. Keywords: Corporate tax, depreciation, imperfect loss offset, decreasing returns, cost of capital, uncertainty URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7643 Files in this item: 1
wpec022003.pdf (341.1Kb) -
Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: In recent years, venture capital has increasingly become a factor in the financing of new firms. We examine how the value of mature firms determines the incentives of entrepreneurs to start up new firms and of venture capitalists to finance and advise them. We examine how capital gains taxes as well as subsidies to start-up costs of new firms affect venture capital-backed entrepreneurship. We also argue that dividend and capital gains taxes on mature firms have important consequences for start-up firms as well. JEL Classification: D82, G24, H24 and H25 Keywords: double moral hazard, entrepreneurship, taxes and venture capital URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7592 Files in this item: 1
cepr nr. 4097.pdf (464.2Kb) -
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We examine how a multinational’s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure is affected by country tax differentials. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs — here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument —, we show that decentralization is preferred in case of small tax differentials, whereas centralization can be more profitable, when tax differentials are large. In essence, the organizational flexibility of MNEs is triggered by the scope for tax minimization. Our analysis allows for both commitment and non-commitment to transfer prices, and for alternative modes of competition. Keywords: Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions, taxes, transfer prices, MNEs. JEL-Classification: H25, F23, L23. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7509 Files in this item: 1
wp7-2006.pdf (234.3Kb) -
GreenlandVesterø Jensen, Carsten; Nielsen, Søren Bo (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: This paper provides an assessment of Greenland's tax system and contemplates changes that may be undertaken in the future to prepare for greater economic self-reliance and for the country's participation in the wider world economy. At the outskirts of Europe, Greenland is an autonomous part of the Danish kingdom, though currently not a member of EU. However, its cooperation with European countries and its dependency on international trade renders it necessary for the tax system in Greenland to be attuned to developments in the rest of the world. Drawing on a thorough international benchmarking analysis of Greenland's tax system, the paper's special focus will be on the corporate tax system and its interplay with personal taxation, as well on as the system of import duties. In particular, we carry out computations of effective marginal and average corporate tax rates, as well as average effective tax burdens on consumption, labour income and capital income, and compare these to similar measures for EU countries. In addition, we outline how Greenland's economic policy in other areas interferes with tax policy. Especially fishery regulation, management of government-owned companies, and housing policy have major implications for the tax system. Key words: international benchmarking, effective tax rates, Greenland JEL: H20, H25 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7595 Files in this item: 1
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Nielsen, Søren Bo; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis; Schjelderup, Guttorm (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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Milhøj, Anders; la Cour, Lisbeth Funding (København, 2006)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We study aggregation - or sample frequencies - of time series, e.g. aggregation from weekly to monthly or quarterly time series. Aggregation usually gives shorter time series but spurious phenomena, in e.g. daily observations, can on the other hand be avoided. An important issue is the effect of aggregation on the adjustment coefficient in cointegrated systems. We study only first order vector autoregressive processes for n dimensional time series Xt, and we illustrate the theory by a two dimensional and a four dimensional model for prices of various grades of gasoline. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7605 Files in this item: 1
wp14-06.pdf (567.4Kb) -
foreign investment in emerging marketsMøllgaard, H. Peter; Overgaard, Per Baltzer (København, 1998)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Asymmetric information and fear of acquiring a 'lemon' may explain the paucity of foreign investment in emerging market economies. If investors are uncertain about the profitability of investments, intrinsically inefficient, temporary partnerships or joint ventures may serve as mechanisms through which information is transmitted. Temporary partnerships with joint in- vestments by the domestic firm and the foreign investor, together with a buy-out option to the investor, can be used to separate good and bad invest- ment prospects in equilibrium. However, non-revealing equilibria may exist. Implications for foreign direct investment are traced and briefly related to the experience of transition economies. Keywords: investment, complementary assets, partnerships, joint ventures and licensing, costly signaling JEL: D8, F2, L14, O12 URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7496 Files in this item: 1
1998_10.pdf (1.238Mb) -
the Danish cement industryla Cour, Lisbeth Funding; Møllgård, Peter (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]
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Blomgren-Hansen, Niels (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Samuelson (1958) analyses a three-period model, whereas Diamod (1965) considers a two-period model. This difference poses the question whether the insights derived by analysing the simple two-period model carry over in the more complicated three-period case. They do. The Samuelson model (no productive capital) has only one positive solution (r = n); however, this root is unstable. The Diamond model (no nonproductive abode of purchasing power) has also only one positive solution; the root is stable but inefficient. In a model with both productive capital and a non-productive abode of purchasing power, the inefficient Diamond solution becomes unstable and the socially optimal solution becomes stable. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7575 Files in this item: 1
wp15-2005.pdf (130.6Kb) -
Motta, Massimo; Rønde, Thomas (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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Monetary Steady StatesGhiglino, Christian; Olai Hansen, Bodil; Tvede, Mich (København, 2000)[More information][Less information]