Browsing Department of Economics (ECON) by Title
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Now showing items 211-218 of 218
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Waisman, Gisela; Larsen, Birthe (Frederiksberg, 2012)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: We exploit the regional variation in negative attitudes towards immigrants to Sweden in order to analyse the consequences of the attitudes on immigrants welfare. We find that attitudes towards immigrants are of importance: they both affect their labour market outcomes and their quality of life. We interpret the negative effect on wages as evidence of labour market discrimination. We estimate the welfare effects of negative attitudes, through their wage and local amenities, for immigrants with different levels of skills, origin, gender and age. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8519 Files in this item: 1
Waisman_Larsen_wp2012-4.pdf (542.0Kb) -
Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker- firm wage bargaining. Workers search for jobs in both the formal and the informal sector. We analyse the impact of higher punishment rates and a higher audit rate on labour market performance. We find that a higher punishment rate reduces the size of the informal sector and reduces unemployment. A higher audit rate has an ambiguous impact on unemployment, and may actually increase the size of the underground economy. JEL-codes: H26 Keywords: Tax evasion, underground economy, matching, bargaining, unemployment. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7487 Files in this item: 1
wpec112003.pdf (294.6Kb) -
Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2001)[More information][Less information]
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An investigation on the performance of admission characteristicsla Cour, Lisbeth; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis (København, 2004)[More information][Less information]
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Waisman, Gisela; Larsen, Birthe (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The eects of discrimination of immigrants on the labour market are studied within a search and wage-bargaining setting including a risk of losing skills during the experience of unemployment. The negative eects of discrimination in the form of higher unemployment and lower wages spread to all workers, immigrants and natives, in all sectors of the economy. The eect is stronger for immigrants, but natives suer as well. An increase in the share of immigrants in the economy exacerbates the problem of discrimination. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7634 Files in this item: 1
wp12-2007.pdf (768.8Kb) -
Bennedsen, Morten (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
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An analysis of the proposed Dutch yardstick mechanismBogetoft, Peter; Mikkers, Misja C.; Halbersma, Rein; Agrell, Per J. (København, 2007)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: Health care provision is undergoing major reforms in Europe as a reaction to rapidly increasing expenditure and lowered political acceptance to commit public finance to cover the deficits. The Dutch government will decide in 2007 if the current budget system will be replaced by a more competitive mechanism, based on the yardstick regulation principle by Shleifer (1985). One of the proposed systems for the reform can be compared to a revenue-cap implementation of a multi-product cost-yardstick mechanism. The redistribution of the sector’s relevant cost is made in proportion to the individual hospitals share of total weighted output. No regulation is made of the multi-lateral contractual relations between users, insurers and hospitals. The scaling weights are updated periodically for new services and as a function of observed excess demand (waiting lists). The mechanism is shown to provide cost-reducing (effort-inducing) incentives for profit-maximizing rational agents in a single-period bargaining game. The game also shows that the regulation acts as a countervailing power for the insurers to reinforce bargaining power. The local distortion of the output profile induced by the regulation is a function of demand elasticity and cost function convexity. In case the revenue target is not binding, no welfare loss is incurred. The regime also provides incentives for cost-reducing investments in the short and the long run. These incentives manifest themselves in local reallocations of output to more efficient producers. The analysis shows that care should be taken in the updating of the weights as to provide incentives for service innovation, as well as to guarantee convergence of the price system. Although this requires econometric analyses, the alternative with a cost-based yardstick is considered superior to a revenue-based ditto for this application. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7661 Files in this item: 1
wp1-2007-yardstick.pdf (1.159Mb) -
Marker-Larsen, Svend (København, 2005)[More information][Less information]
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Now showing items 211-218 of 218