Outsourcing central banking

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dc.contributor.author	Khoury, Sarkis Joseph	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Wihlborg, Clas	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2009-02-04T10:26:18Z
dc.date.available	2009-02-04T10:26:18Z
dc.date.issued	2005-12-09T00:00:00Z	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7168
dc.description.abstract	The literature on Currency Boards (CB) stops at the water edge in terms of dealing with the totality of the functions of a central bank. Monetary policy, and banking supervision can be "outsourced" in an open economy with substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) in the banking sector if political nationalism does not trump economic rationality. An orthodox CB renders the central banking function redundant in terms of interest rate and exchange rate determination. FDI in banking could perform the same role for the supervisory function of central banks. We use the case of Estonia to illustrate the feasibility of, and constraints on, outsourcing of central bank functions. A brief discussion of the Argentinian experience is used for contrast. Key words: Currency Board, Foreign Banks, Supervision, Regional Integration,outsourcing.	en_US
dc.format.extent	54 s.	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	LEFIC Working paper;2005-003	en_US
dc.title	Outsourcing central banking	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.accessionstatus	modt05dec09 miel	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Institut for Finansiering	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort	FI	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Department of Finance	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	FI	en_US
dc.description.notes	In memory of Vello Vensel, 1941-2004	en_US
dc.idnumber	x656504179	en_US
dc.publisher.city	København	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2005	en_US
dc.title.subtitle	Lessons from Estonia	en_US