Legal ignorance and optimal standards of negligence

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Legal ignorance and optimal standards of negligence

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dc.contributor.author Lando, Henrik en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:26:30Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:26:30Z
dc.date.issued 2006-12-14T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7239
dc.description.abstract How should a court set the negligence standard in a given area of activity when future (potential) injurers or victims are unlikely to know the standard set by the court? In particular, how should the standard be set in the oft-occurring case where one of the future parties is a professional actor who is likely to know the legal standard of negligence, while the other is an amateur, who is unlikely to know it? In this case, it may be optimal for the court to set the standards at the first-best level despite the amateur's ignorance of the law. The amateur may be able to infer the standards, either from the situation itself (from his knowledge of the costs and benefits of precautions), or from the act performed by the professional party. Moreover, the amateur may take due care because he realizes that the professional party will have an incentive to live up to the standard, and that the risk of a loss will therefore be on the amateur. However, when the ignorance of the amateur is "large," involving not only the legal standards but also the risks inherent in the activity, it may well be optimal for the court to depart from first best standards. en_US
dc.format.extent 34 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.language dan en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2006 en_US
dc.subject.other negligence standards, legal ignorance en_US
dc.title Legal ignorance and optimal standards of negligence en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt06dec14 chlamo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Industriøkonomi og Virksomhedsstrategi en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort IVS en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Industrial Economics & Strategy en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort IES en_US
dc.idnumber x656537409 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2006 en_US


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