On Sharks, Trolls, and Other Patent Animals

OPEN ARCHIVE

Union Jack
Dannebrog

On Sharks, Trolls, and Other Patent Animals

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Reitzig, Markus en_US
dc.contributor.author Henkel, Joachim en_US
dc.contributor.author Heath, Christopher en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:26:32Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:26:32Z
dc.date.issued 2007-04-16T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7249
dc.description.abstract Patent trolls (or sharks) are small patent holding individuals or firms who trap R&D intense manufacturers in patent infringement situations in order to receive damage awards for the illegitimate use of their technology. While of great concern to management, their existence and impact for both corporate decision makers and policy makers remains to be fully analyzed from an academic standpoint. In this paper we show why patent sharks can operate profitably, why they are of growing concern, how manufacturers can forearm themselves against them, and which issues policy makers need to address. To do so, we map international indemnification rules with strategic rationales of small patent-holding firms within a game-theoretical model. Our central finding is that the courts’ unrealistic consideration of the trade-offs faced by inadvertent infringers is a central condition for sharks to operate profitably. Keywords: Patent, patent shark, patent troll, damage award, infringement JEL Classifications: M00, M11, M21, K00, K11, K33 en_US
dc.format.extent 33 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;February 2006 en_US
dc.subject.other immaterielle rettigheder en_US
dc.subject.other patenter en_US
dc.title On Sharks, Trolls, and Other Patent Animals en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt07apr16 mielmo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Industriøkonomi og Virksomhedsstrategi en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort IVS en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Industrial Economics & Strategy en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort IES en_US
dc.idnumber x656545967 en_US
dc.publisher.year 2006 en_US
dc.title.subtitle 'Being Infringed' as a Normatively Induced Innovation Exploitation Strategy en_US


Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.

Files Size Format View
ssrn-id885914.pdf 270.9Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record