Tying the Manager's Hands

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Tying the Manager's Hands

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dc.contributor.author Foss, Kirsten en_US
dc.contributor.author Foss, Nicolai J. en_US
dc.contributor.author Vázquez-Vicente, Xosé H. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:26:41Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:26:41Z
dc.date.issued 2003-10-28T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7296
dc.description.abstract Abstract We discuss and empirically examine a firm-level equivalent of the ancient problem of "tying the King’s hands," namely how to maximize managerial intervention for "good cause," while avoiding intervention for "bad cause." Managers may opportunistically intervene when such intervention produces private benefits. Overall firm performance is harmed as a result, because opportunistic managerial intervention harms employee motivation. The central point of the paper is that various mechanisms and factors, such as managers staking their personal reputation, employees controlling important assets, strong trade unions, corporate culture, etc. may function as constraints on managerial proclivities to opportunistically intervene. Thus, firms can make credible commitments that check managerial proclivities to opportunistically intervene. We derive 5 hypotheses from these ideas, and test them, using path-analysis, on a rich dataset, based on 329 firms in the Spanish food and electric/electronic industries. en_US
dc.format.extent 38 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries DRUID Working Paper;2003-10 en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries CKG Working Paper;2003-05 en_US
dc.subject.other tillid en_US
dc.subject.other transaktionsomkostninger en_US
dc.subject.other ledelseskultur en_US
dc.subject.other lederstil en_US
dc.subject.other theory of the firm en_US
dc.title Tying the Manager's Hands en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Industriøkonomi og Virksomhedsstrategi en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Ledelse, Politik og Filosofi en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort INT
dc.contributor.departmentshort LPF
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of International Economics and Management en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Management, Politics & Philosophy en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort INT
dc.contributor.departmentukshort MPP
dc.idnumber x656312083 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2003 en_US
dc.title.subtitle How Firms Can Make Credible Commitments That Make Opportunistic Managerial Intervention Less Likely en_US


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