Tying the Manager's Hands

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dc.contributor.author	Foss, Kirsten	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Foss, Nicolai J.	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Vázquez-Vicente, Xosé H.	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2009-02-04T10:26:41Z
dc.date.available	2009-02-04T10:26:41Z
dc.date.issued	2003-10-28T00:00:00Z	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7296
dc.description.abstract	Abstract We discuss and empirically examine a firm-level equivalent of the ancient problem of "tying the King’s hands," namely how to maximize managerial intervention for "good cause," while avoiding intervention for "bad cause." Managers may opportunistically intervene when such intervention produces private benefits. Overall firm performance is harmed as a result, because opportunistic managerial intervention harms employee motivation. The central point of the paper is that various mechanisms and factors, such as managers staking their personal reputation, employees controlling important assets, strong trade unions, corporate culture, etc. may function as constraints on managerial proclivities to opportunistically intervene. Thus, firms can make credible commitments that check managerial proclivities to opportunistically intervene. We derive 5 hypotheses from these ideas, and test them, using path-analysis, on a rich dataset, based on 329 firms in the Spanish food and electric/electronic industries.	en_US
dc.format.extent	38 s.	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	DRUID Working Paper;2003-10	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	CKG Working Paper;2003-05	en_US
dc.subject.other	tillid	en_US
dc.subject.other	transaktionsomkostninger	en_US
dc.subject.other	ledelseskultur	en_US
dc.subject.other	lederstil	en_US
dc.subject.other	theory of the firm	en_US
dc.title	Tying the Manager's Hands	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Institut for Industriøkonomi og Virksomhedsstrategi	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Institut for Ledelse, Politik og Filosofi	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort	INT
dc.contributor.departmentshort	LPF
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Department of International Economics and Management	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Department of Management, Politics & Philosophy	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	INT
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	MPP
dc.idnumber	x656312083	en_US
dc.publisher.city	København	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2003	en_US
dc.title.subtitle	How Firms Can Make Credible Commitments That Make Opportunistic Managerial Intervention Less Likely	en_US