Organizational Governance

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Organizational Governance

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Titel: Organizational Governance
Forfatter: Foss, Nicolai J.; Klein, Peter G.
Resume: This chapter reviews and discusses rational-choice approaches to organizational governance. These approaches are found primarily in organizational economics (virtually no rational-choice organizational sociology exists), particularly in transaction cost economics, principal-agent theory, and the incomplete-contracts or property-rights approach. We distill the main unifying characteristics of these streams, survey each stream, and offer some critical commentary and suggestions for moving forward.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7438
Dato: 2007-11-12

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