Organizational Governance

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Organizational Governance

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dc.contributor.author Foss, Nicolai J. en_US
dc.contributor.author Klein, Peter G. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:27:20Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:27:20Z
dc.date.issued 2007-11-12T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.isbn 9788791815126 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7438
dc.description.abstract This chapter reviews and discusses rational-choice approaches to organizational governance. These approaches are found primarily in organizational economics (virtually no rational-choice organizational sociology exists), particularly in transaction cost economics, principal-agent theory, and the incomplete-contracts or property-rights approach. We distill the main unifying characteristics of these streams, survey each stream, and offer some critical commentary and suggestions for moving forward. en_US
dc.format.extent 74 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2007-11 en_US
dc.title Organizational Governance en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt07nov12 ligamo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Center for Strategi og Globalisering en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort SMG en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Center for Strategic Management and Globalization en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort SMG en_US
dc.idnumber 9788791815126 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2007 en_US


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