| dc.contributor.author |
Foss, Nicolai J. |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.author |
Klein, Peter G. |
en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-02-04T10:27:20Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2009-02-04T10:27:20Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2007-11-12T00:00:00Z |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.isbn |
9788791815126 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7438 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
This chapter reviews and discusses rational-choice approaches to organizational governance. These approaches are found primarily in organizational economics (virtually no rational-choice organizational sociology exists), particularly in transaction cost economics, principal-agent theory, and the incomplete-contracts or property-rights approach. We distill the main unifying characteristics of these streams, survey each stream, and offer some critical commentary and suggestions for moving forward. |
en_US |
| dc.format.extent |
74 s. |
en_US |
| dc.language |
eng |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Working paper;2007-11 |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Organizational Governance |
en_US |
| dc.type |
wp |
en_US |
| dc.accessionstatus |
modt07nov12 ligamo |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.corporation |
Copenhagen Business School. CBS |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.department |
Center for Strategi og Globalisering |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.departmentshort |
SMG |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.departmentuk |
Center for Strategic Management and Globalization |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.departmentukshort |
SMG |
en_US |
| dc.idnumber |
9788791815126 |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.city |
København |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.year |
2007 |
en_US |
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.
