Wages, unemployment, and the underground economy

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Wages, unemployment, and the underground economy

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dc.contributor.author Kolm, Ann-Sofie en_US
dc.contributor.author Larsen, Birthe en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:27:30Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:27:30Z
dc.date.issued 2004-01-21T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7487
dc.description.abstract While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker- firm wage bargaining. Workers search for jobs in both the formal and the informal sector. We analyse the impact of higher punishment rates and a higher audit rate on labour market performance. We find that a higher punishment rate reduces the size of the informal sector and reduces unemployment. A higher audit rate has an ambiguous impact on unemployment, and may actually increase the size of the underground economy. JEL-codes: H26 Keywords: Tax evasion, underground economy, matching, bargaining, unemployment. en_US
dc.format.extent 32 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;11-2003 en_US
dc.subject.other lønteori en_US
dc.subject.other arbejdsløshed en_US
dc.subject.other sort økonomi en_US
dc.subject.other sort arbejde en_US
dc.subject.other skatteomgåelse en_US
dc.title Wages, unemployment, and the underground economy en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt04jan21 mielmo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Nationaløkonomi en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON
dc.idnumber x656378807 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2003 en_US


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