Wages, unemployment, and the underground economy

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dc.contributor.author	Kolm, Ann-Sofie	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Larsen, Birthe	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2009-02-04T10:27:30Z
dc.date.available	2009-02-04T10:27:30Z
dc.date.issued	2004-01-21T00:00:00Z	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7487
dc.description.abstract	While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker- firm wage bargaining. Workers search for jobs in both the formal and the informal sector. We analyse the impact of higher punishment rates and a higher audit rate on labour market performance. We find that a higher punishment rate reduces the size of the informal sector and reduces unemployment. A higher audit rate has an ambiguous impact on unemployment, and may actually increase the size of the underground economy. JEL-codes: H26 Keywords: Tax evasion, underground economy, matching, bargaining, unemployment.	en_US
dc.format.extent	32 s.	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper;11-2003	en_US
dc.subject.other	lønteori	en_US
dc.subject.other	arbejdsløshed	en_US
dc.subject.other	sort økonomi	en_US
dc.subject.other	sort arbejde	en_US
dc.subject.other	skatteomgåelse	en_US
dc.title	Wages, unemployment, and the underground economy	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.accessionstatus	modt04jan21 mielmo	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Institut for Nationaløkonomi	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort	ECON	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Department of Economics	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	ECON
dc.idnumber	x656378807	en_US
dc.publisher.city	København	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2003	en_US