The politics of foreign aid

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The politics of foreign aid

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dc.contributor.author Mayer, Wolfgang en_US
dc.contributor.author Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:27:31Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:27:31Z
dc.date.issued 1999-03-16T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7488
dc.description.abstract Why do donor countries give foreign aid? The answers found in the literature are: (i) because donor countries care for recipient countries (e.g. altruism), and/or (ii) because there exist distortions that make the indirect gains from foreign aid (e.g. terms of trade effects) to be larger than the direct losses. This paper proposes a third answer to the above question, namely that aid is determined through the domestic political process of the donor country. The paper demonstrates how foreign aid affects the donor country’s income distribution and how, in a direct democracy, the majority of voters might benefit from foreign aid giving even though the country’s social welfare is reduced. JEL Classification: F35 Keywords: foreign aid, politics, majority voting. en_US
dc.format.extent 18 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;1999-4 en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries EPRU working paper;1999-7 en_US
dc.subject.other udviklingsbistand en_US
dc.title The politics of foreign aid en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus AAmodt99mar10 KAT99mar16 flema en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.corporation University of Copenhagen en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Nationaløkonomi en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON
dc.idnumber x644977670 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 1999 en_US


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