Taxes and Decision Rights in Multinationals

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Taxes and Decision Rights in Multinationals

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dc.contributor.author Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis en_US
dc.contributor.author Schjelderup, Guttorm en_US
dc.contributor.author Nielsen, Søren Bo en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:27:36Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:27:36Z
dc.date.issued 2006-10-31T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7509
dc.description.abstract We examine how a multinational’s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure is affected by country tax differentials. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs — here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument —, we show that decentralization is preferred in case of small tax differentials, whereas centralization can be more profitable, when tax differentials are large. In essence, the organizational flexibility of MNEs is triggered by the scope for tax minimization. Our analysis allows for both commitment and non-commitment to transfer prices, and for alternative modes of competition. Keywords: Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions, taxes, transfer prices, MNEs. JEL-Classification: H25, F23, L23. en_US
dc.format.extent 21 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2006-007 en_US
dc.subject.other multinationale selskaber en_US
dc.subject.other skatter en_US
dc.subject.other interne priser en_US
dc.title Taxes and Decision Rights in Multinationals en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt06okt31 mielmo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.description.notes October 3, 2006 en_US
dc.idnumber x656517785 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2006 en_US


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