Taxes and Decision Rights in Multinationals

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dc.contributor.author	Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Schjelderup, Guttorm	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Nielsen, Søren Bo	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2009-02-04T10:27:36Z
dc.date.available	2009-02-04T10:27:36Z
dc.date.issued	2006-10-31T00:00:00Z	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7509
dc.description.abstract	We examine how a multinational’s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure is affected by country tax differentials. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs — here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument —, we show that decentralization is preferred in case of small tax differentials, whereas centralization can be more profitable, when tax differentials are large. In essence, the organizational flexibility of MNEs is triggered by the scope for tax minimization. Our analysis allows for both commitment and non-commitment to transfer prices, and for alternative modes of competition. Keywords: Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions, taxes, transfer prices, MNEs. JEL-Classification: H25, F23, L23.	en_US
dc.format.extent	21 s.	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper;2006-007	en_US
dc.subject.other	multinationale selskaber	en_US
dc.subject.other	skatter	en_US
dc.subject.other	interne priser	en_US
dc.title	Taxes and Decision Rights in Multinationals	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.accessionstatus	modt06okt31 mielmo	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Økonomisk Institut	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort	ECON	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Department of Economics	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	ECON	en_US
dc.description.notes	October 3, 2006	en_US
dc.idnumber	x656517785	en_US
dc.publisher.city	København	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2006	en_US