Labour Market Programmes and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-off


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Labour Market Programmes and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-off

Vis færre oplysninger Filges, Trine en_US Kennes, John en_US Larsen, Birthe en_US Tranæs, Torben en_US 2009-02-04T10:27:36Z 2009-02-04T10:27:36Z 2005-11-09T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.description.abstract This paper studies labour market policy in a society where differently gifted individuals can invest in training to further increase their labour market productivity and where the government seeks both effiency and equity. Frictions in the matching process create unemployment and differently skilled workers face different unemployment risks. We show that in such an environment, training programmes that are targeted to the unemployed complement passive transfers (UI benefits), unlike a general training subsidy. Combining passive subsidies with a training subsidy conditioned on the individual being unemployed (for a while) - the typical Active Labour Market Programme - implies a favorable trade-off between equity and efficiency which encourages high spending on training. en_US
dc.format.extent 42 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2005-011 en_US
dc.title Labour Market Programmes and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-off en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt05nov09 miel en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.description.notes Trykt på titel bladet:First Version: July 2003, This version: April 2005 en_US
dc.idnumber x656503849 en_US København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2005 en_US

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