Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly


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Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly

Vis færre oplysninger Overgaard, Per Baltzer en_US Møllgaard, Peter en_US 2009-02-04T10:27:39Z 2009-02-04T10:27:39Z 2005-11-16T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.description.abstract In the economics literature, various views on the likely (efficiency) effects of information exchange, communication between firms and market transparency present themselves. Often these views on information flows are highly conflicting. On the one hand, it is argued that increased information dissemination improves firm planning to the benefit of society (including customers) and/or allows potential customers to make the right decisions given their preferences. On the other hand, the literature also suggests that increased information dissemination can have significant coordinating or collusive potential to the benefit of firms but at the expense of society at large (mainly, potential customers). In this chapter, we try to make sense of these views, with the aim of presenting some simple lessons for antitrust practice. In addition, the chapter presents some cases, from both sides of the Atlantic, where informational issues have played a significant role. en_US
dc.format.extent 26 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2005-013 en_US
dc.title Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt05nov16 miel en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.description.notes Prepared for Wayne Dale Collins (ed.), Issues in Competition Law and Policy, (forthcoming) Bar Association. We wish to thank Christopher Wilson, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia for comments on an earlier draft. en_US
dc.idnumber x65650389x en_US København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2005 en_US

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