Commodity Taxation and Parallel Imports

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Commodity Taxation and Parallel Imports

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dc.contributor.author Schmitt, Nicolas en_US
dc.contributor.author Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:27:40Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:27:40Z
dc.date.issued 2007-11-23T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7538
dc.description.abstract We examine the interaction between commodity taxes and parallel imports in a simple two-country model with imperfect competition. While governments determine non-cooperatively their commodity tax rate, the volume of parallel imports is determined endogenously by the retailing sector. We compare the positive and normative implications of having commodity taxes based on destination or origin principle. Origin taxes are shown to have very attractive properties: they lead to lower levels of optimal taxes, they converge as parallel imports increase (while destination taxes diverge), and they lead to higher welfare levels. en_US
dc.format.extent 22 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2007-4 en_US
dc.title Commodity Taxation and Parallel Imports en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt07nov23 ligamo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.idnumber x656554605 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2007 en_US


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