Non-Preferential Trading Clubs

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Non-Preferential Trading Clubs

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dc.contributor.author Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis en_US
dc.contributor.author Woodland, Alan D. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:27:41Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:27:41Z
dc.date.issued 2004-10-08T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7540
dc.description.abstract This paper examines the welfare implications of non-discriminatory tariff reforms by a subset of countries, which we term a non-preferential trading club. We show that there exist coordinated tariff reforms, accompanied by appropriate income transfers between the member countries, that unambiguously increase the welfare of these countries while leaving the welfare of non-members unaltered. In terms of economic policy implications, our results show that there exist regional, MFN-consistent arrangements that lead to Pareto improvements in world welfare. JEL code: F15. Keywords: Trading clubs, non-preferential tariff reform, Kemp-Wan-Ohyama proposition. en_US
dc.format.extent 29 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2004-006 en_US
dc.subject.other kep en_US
dc.title Non-Preferential Trading Clubs en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt04okt07 miel en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.idnumber x656444249 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2004 en_US


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