Competition in Soccer Leagues

OPEN ARCHIVE

Union Jack
Dannebrog

Competition in Soccer Leagues

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Tvede, Mich en_US
dc.contributor.author Olai Hansen, Bodil en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:27:43Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:27:43Z
dc.date.issued 2007-12-06T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7555
dc.description.abstract In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings just before the transfer window closes in european soccer. competition between sports clubs, dimension of quality of players, equilibrium in pure strategies, equilibrium in mixed strategies. en_US
dc.format.extent 10 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2007-10 en_US
dc.title Competition in Soccer Leagues en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt07dec06 nijemo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.idnumber x656555741 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2007 en_US


Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.

Files Size Format View
wp10-2007.pdf 371.3Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record