Lobbying Bureaucrats

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Lobbying Bureaucrats

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dc.contributor.author Bennedsen, Morten en_US
dc.contributor.author Feldmann, Sven E. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:27:44Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:27:44Z
dc.date.issued 2004-06-08T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7561
dc.description.abstract This paper studies how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes the legislature’s willingness to delegate decision-making authority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to account for interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy and apply it to different institutional structures of government. The paper addresses the following questions: First, how does the decision to delegate change when the bureaucratic agent is subject to external influence? What cost does this influence impose on the legislative principal? Finally, how susceptible are policy choices to bureaucratic lobbying under different government structures? In answering these questions, the paper seeks to provide a comparative theory of lobbying and to explain the different patterns of interest group activity across political systems. en_US
dc.format.extent 43 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2004-04 en_US
dc.subject.other kep en_US
dc.title Lobbying Bureaucrats en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt04jun08 mielmo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Nationaløkonomi en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON
dc.idnumber x656409265 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2004 en_US
dc.title.subtitle Delegation and Influence Under Alternative Political Structures en_US


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