Steepest Ascent Tariff Reforms

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Steepest Ascent Tariff Reforms

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dc.contributor.author Woodland, Alan D. en_US
dc.contributor.author Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:27:44Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:27:44Z
dc.date.issued 2006-10-31T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7565
dc.description.abstract This paper introduces the concept of a steepest ascent tariff reform for a small open economy. By construction, it is locally optimal in that it yields the highest gain in utility of any feasible tariff reform vector of the same length. Accordingly, it provides a convenient benchmark for the evaluation of the welfare effectiveness of other well known tariff reform rules, as e.g. the proportional and the concertina rules. We develop the properties of this tariff reform, characterize the sources of the potential welfare gains from tariff reform, use it to establish conditions under which some existing reforms are locally optimal, provide geometric illustrations and compare welfare effectiveness of reforms using numerical examples. Moreover, being a general concept, we apply it to the issue of market access and examine its implications. Overall, the paper’s contribution lies in presenting a theoretical concept where the focus is upon the size of welfare gains accruing from tariff reforms rather than simply with the direction of welfare effects that has been the concern of the literature. JEL code: F15. Keywords: Steepest ascent tariff reforms; piecemeal tariff policy; welfare; market access; small open economy. en_US
dc.format.extent 42 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2006-004 en_US
dc.subject.other takstpolitik en_US
dc.subject.other velfærd en_US
dc.subject.other told en_US
dc.title Steepest Ascent Tariff Reforms en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt06okt31 mielmo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.idnumber x656517750 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2006 en_US


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