Vertically Integrated Firms' Investments in Electricity Generating Capacities

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Vertically Integrated Firms' Investments in Electricity Generating Capacities

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dc.contributor.author Boom, Anette en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:27:45Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:27:45Z
dc.date.issued 2007-12-06T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7572
dc.description.abstract We compare investments in generating capacities of an integrated monopolist with the aggregate investments of two vertically integrated competing firms. The firms invest in their capacity and fix the retail price while electricity demand is uncertain. The wholesale price is determined in a unit price auction where the firms know the level of demand when they bid their capacities. Total capacities can be larger or smaller with a duopoly than with a monopoly. If the two firms select the Pareto dominant equilibrium, then the retail price is always higher and the social welfare lower in the duopoly case. en_US
dc.format.extent 48 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2007-3 en_US
dc.title Vertically Integrated Firms' Investments in Electricity Generating Capacities en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt07dec06 nijemo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.idnumber x656555733 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2007 en_US


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