Skill level, Cognitive Ability, Unemployment and Welfare


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Skill level, Cognitive Ability, Unemployment and Welfare

Vis færre oplysninger Larsen, Birthe en_US 2009-02-04T10:27:48Z 2009-02-04T10:27:48Z 2004-12-27T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.description.abstract This paper examines the implications of that workers may not be able to estimate their true costs of acquiring skills. Consequently, too few workers may acquire skills. This allows for the possibility that subsidizing education is welfare improving. Furthermore, if the presence of skill-biased technological shocks increase unemployment, this may explain why the market it-self cannot respond to this by making it sufficiently attractive to acquire skills. Consequently, the trade-off in-between subsidizing education and thereby reducing unemployment and optimizing welfare may be eliminated. We analyse this issue in a simple educational model and next in a search equilibrium model including a skill choice decision. Keywords: Education, subsidies, efficiency, unemployment. JEL codes: I20, J64. en_US
dc.format.extent 21 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2004-017 en_US
dc.subject.other kep en_US
dc.title Skill level, Cognitive Ability, Unemployment and Welfare en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt04dec27 miel en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.idnumber x656455038 en_US København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2004 en_US

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