Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling


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Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling

Vis færre oplysninger Lund, Diderik en_US Nilssen, Tore en_US 2009-02-04T10:27:49Z 2009-02-04T10:27:49Z 2003-10-21T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.description.abstract Abstract We discuss the existence of a pooling equilibrium in a two-period model of an insurance market with asymmetric information. We solve the model numerically. We pay particular attention to the reasons for non-existence in cases where no pooling equilibrium exists. In addition to the phenom- enon of cream skimming emphasized in earlier literature, we here point to the the importance of the opposite: dregs skimming, whereby high-risk consumers are proÞtably detracted from the candidate pooling contract. en_US
dc.format.extent 24 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Paper;2003-1 en_US
dc.subject.other forskningsøkonomi en_US
dc.subject.other asymetrisk information en_US
dc.subject.other konkurrenceformer en_US
dc.title Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt03okt21 inrumo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Nationaløkonomi en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON
dc.idnumber x656102518 en_US København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2003 en_US
dc.title.subtitle On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening en_US

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