Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling

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dc.contributor.author	Lund, Diderik	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Nilssen, Tore	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2009-02-04T10:27:49Z
dc.date.available	2009-02-04T10:27:49Z
dc.date.issued	2003-10-21T00:00:00Z	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7596
dc.description.abstract	Abstract We discuss the existence of a pooling equilibrium in a two-period model of an insurance market with asymmetric information. We solve the model numerically. We pay particular attention to the reasons for non-existence in cases where no pooling equilibrium exists. In addition to the phenom- enon of cream skimming emphasized in earlier literature, we here point to the the importance of the opposite: dregs skimming, whereby high-risk consumers are proÞtably detracted from the candidate pooling contract.	en_US
dc.format.extent	24 s.	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working Paper;2003-1	en_US
dc.subject.other	forskningsøkonomi	en_US
dc.subject.other	asymetrisk information	en_US
dc.subject.other	konkurrenceformer	en_US
dc.title	Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.accessionstatus	modt03okt21 inrumo	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Institut for Nationaløkonomi	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort	ECON	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Department of Economics	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	ECON
dc.idnumber	x656102518	en_US
dc.publisher.city	København	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2003	en_US
dc.title.subtitle	On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening	en_US