Arm’s Length Provision of Public Services


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Arm’s Length Provision of Public Services

Show simple item record Schultz, Christian en_US Bennedsen, Morten en_US 2009-02-04T10:27:50Z 2009-02-04T10:27:50Z 2007-12-05T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.description.abstract We analyze the economic consequences of strategic delegation of the right to decide between public or private provision of governmental service and/or the authority to negotiate and renegotiate with the chosen service provider. Our model encompass both bureaucratic delegation from a government to a privatization agency and electoral delegation from voters to a government. We identify two powerfull effects of delegation when contracts are incomplete: The incentive effect increases the incentive part of service providers’ remuneration and we show that strategic delegation may substitute formal incentive contracts. The bargaining effect improves the bargaining position vis a vis a private firm with market power and leads to a lower price for the service. Outsourcing, Strategic Delegation, Incentives, Incomplete Contracting, Market Power, Representative Democracy. en_US
dc.format.extent 41 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2007-7 en_US
dc.title Arm’s Length Provision of Public Services en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt07dec05 nijemo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.idnumber x656555628 en_US København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2007 en_US

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