Accounting for Moral Hazard In Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

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Accounting for Moral Hazard In Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

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dc.contributor.author Keiding, Hans en_US
dc.contributor.author Hansen, Bodil O. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:27:53Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:27:53Z
dc.date.issued 2007-11-23T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7626
dc.description.abstract In the paper, we use the theory of mechanism design to exhibit the cost of efficient provision of healthcare, defined as the uniquely defined sum of individual side payments which would eliminate moral hazard. It is argued that this cost may be used to assess the costs arising from use of the treatment in cases where it is not appropriate from a strictly medical point of view. An example is given to indicate how this assessment might enter into practical cost-effectiveness analysis. en_US
dc.format.extent 15 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2007-5 en_US
dc.title Accounting for Moral Hazard In Cost-Effectiveness Analysis en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt07nov23 ligamo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.idnumber x656554613 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2007 en_US


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