Social Preferences and Labor Market Policy

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Social Preferences and Labor Market Policy

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dc.contributor.author Kennes, John en_US
dc.contributor.author Tranæs, Torben en_US
dc.contributor.author Larsen, Birthe en_US
dc.contributor.author Filges, Trine en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:27:56Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:27:56Z
dc.date.issued 2006-12-05T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7648
dc.description.abstract We find that the main featues of labor policy across OECD countries can be explained by a simple general equilibrium search model with risk neutral agents and a government that chooses policy to maximize a social welfare function. In equilibrum, policies are chosen to optimal redistribute income from advantaged to disadvantaged workers. A worker can be disadvantaged in the sense that they may have less ability to aquire and utilize skills in the workplace. The model explains why passive benefits tend to fall and active benefits tend to increase during the course of unemployment spell. The model also explains why countries that appear to pursue equity spend more on both active and passive labor market programs. en_US
dc.format.extent 30 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2006-013 en_US
dc.title Social Preferences and Labor Market Policy en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt06dec05 mielmo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.description.notes First Version: July 2003 en_US
dc.description.notes This version: February 2006 en_US
dc.idnumber x656517955 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2006 en_US


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