| dc.contributor.author |
Nielsen, Søren Bo |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.author |
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.author |
Schjelderup, Guttorm |
en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-02-04T10:27:57Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2009-02-04T10:27:57Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2005-11-08T00:00:00Z |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7652 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise's choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs – here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument –, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.
Keywords: Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions, taxes, MNEs.
JEL-Classification: H25, F23, L23. |
en_US |
| dc.format.extent |
17 s. |
en_US |
| dc.language |
eng |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Working paper;2005-010 |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Centralized vs. De-centralized Multinationals and Taxes |
en_US |
| dc.type |
wp |
en_US |
| dc.accessionstatus |
modt05nov08 miel |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.corporation |
Copenhagen Business School. CBS |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.department |
Økonomisk Institut |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.departmentshort |
ECON |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.departmentuk |
Department of Economics |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.departmentukshort |
ECON |
en_US |
| dc.idnumber |
x656503806 |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.city |
København |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.year |
2005 |
en_US |
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.
