Centralized vs. De-centralized Multinationals and Taxes

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Centralized vs. De-centralized Multinationals and Taxes

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dc.contributor.author Nielsen, Søren Bo en_US
dc.contributor.author Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis en_US
dc.contributor.author Schjelderup, Guttorm en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:27:57Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:27:57Z
dc.date.issued 2005-11-08T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7652
dc.description.abstract The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise's choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs – here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument –, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large. Keywords: Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions, taxes, MNEs. JEL-Classification: H25, F23, L23. en_US
dc.format.extent 17 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2005-010 en_US
dc.title Centralized vs. De-centralized Multinationals and Taxes en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt05nov08 miel en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.idnumber x656503806 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2005 en_US


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