Mixed R&D incentives: the effect of R&D subsidies on patented inventions

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Mixed R&D incentives: the effect of R&D subsidies on patented inventions

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dc.contributor.author Schneider, Cedric en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:28:00Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:28:00Z
dc.date.issued 2008-12-01T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7662
dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes the effects of mixed public-private R&D incentives and empirically tests whether patents that were publicly sponsored are more important than non-subsidized ones. Blending patents and public subsidies will allow the funding agency to subsidize inventions that would otherwise not elicit investment because the private incentive will not fully cover the cost of the invention. Thus, the policy maker will only subsidize inventions that have a high social value. The empirical analysis shows that subsidized inventions result in more important patents, as measured by the number of forward citations. en_US
dc.format.extent 21 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2008-06 en_US
dc.title Mixed R&D incentives: the effect of R&D subsidies on patented inventions en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt08dec01 nijemo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.idnumber x656557272 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2008 en_US


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