The Expansion of Higher Education and Time-Consistent Taxation

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The Expansion of Higher Education and Time-Consistent Taxation

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dc.contributor.author Poutvaara, Panu en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:28:12Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:28:12Z
dc.date.issued 2007-12-04T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7684
dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes educational choices and political support for subsidies to higher education in the presence of a time-consistency problem in income redistribution. There may be political support for so generous subsidization that it motivates the median voter to obtain higher education. As a result of increasing own income, the median voter prefers in the future lower taxes than without higher education. Therefore, the expansion of participation in higher education during the second half of the 20th century may have partly been driven by the aim to limit the political support for overly generous income redistribution. education, time-consistency problem, voting, subsidies to education en_US
dc.format.extent 12 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Discussion paper;2007-17 en_US
dc.title The Expansion of Higher Education and Time-Consistent Taxation en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt07dec04 nijemo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Centre for Economic and Business Research en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort CEBR en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Centre for Economic and Business Research en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort CEBR en_US
dc.idnumber x656555555 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2007 en_US


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