Income taxes, property values, and migration


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Income taxes, property values, and migration

Vis færre oplysninger Glazer, Amihai en_US Kanniainen, Vesa en_US Poutvaara, Panu en_US 2009-02-04T10:28:14Z 2009-02-04T10:28:14Z 2008-12-05T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.description.abstract We consider the effects of income redistribution when people can migrate from one country to another, and when land within each country is heterogeneous. Taxes related to income can then affect property values, and can induce migration, which further affects property values. We show that under these conditions a utilitarian government should never equalize after-tax incomes. If migration is impossible, it may even transfer income from the poor to the rich, reducing the rents earned by absentee landlords. The redistributive tax on the rich may be higher or lower when the rich can migrate than when they cannot. A Rawlsian government in the absence of mobility will equalize after-tax incomes. Under mobility, Rawlsian governments cut their taxes if and only if the relative pre-tax income of the poor is sufficiently low. en_US
dc.format.extent 10 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2008-05 en_US
dc.title Income taxes, property values, and migration en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt08dec05 nijemo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Centre for Economic and Business Research en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort CEBR en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Centre for Economic and Business Research en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort CEBR en_US
dc.idnumber x656557353 en_US København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2008 en_US

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