Under - reporting of Income and Labor Market Performance

dc.contributor.author	Kolm, Ann-Sofie	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Nielsen, Søren Bo	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2009-02-04T10:28:17Z
dc.date.available	2009-02-04T10:28:17Z
dc.date.issued	2007-12-17T00:00:00Z	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7699
dc.description.abstract	To examine the effects on labor market performance of government tax and enforcement policies, this paper develops an equilibrium model featuring tax evasion, matching frictions, and worker-firm wage bargains. In the wage bargains, workers and firms can agree on the amount of remuneration that should not be reported to the tax authorities. We find that increased taxation actually reduces unemployment, whereas more zealous enforcement has the opposite effect.	en_US
dc.format.extent	31 s.	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion paper;2007-10	en_US
dc.title	Under - reporting of Income and Labor Market Performance	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.accessionstatus	modt07dec17 nijemo	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Centre for Economic and Business Research	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort	CEBR	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Centre for Economic and Business Research	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	CEBR	en_US
dc.idnumber	x656555997	en_US
dc.publisher.city	København	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2007	en_US