Under - reporting of Income and Labor Market Performance

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Under - reporting of Income and Labor Market Performance

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dc.contributor.author Kolm, Ann-Sofie en_US
dc.contributor.author Nielsen, Søren Bo en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-04T10:28:17Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-04T10:28:17Z
dc.date.issued 2007-12-17T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7699
dc.description.abstract To examine the effects on labor market performance of government tax and enforcement policies, this paper develops an equilibrium model featuring tax evasion, matching frictions, and worker-firm wage bargains. In the wage bargains, workers and firms can agree on the amount of remuneration that should not be reported to the tax authorities. We find that increased taxation actually reduces unemployment, whereas more zealous enforcement has the opposite effect. en_US
dc.format.extent 31 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Discussion paper;2007-10 en_US
dc.title Under - reporting of Income and Labor Market Performance en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt07dec17 nijemo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Centre for Economic and Business Research en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort CEBR en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Centre for Economic and Business Research en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort CEBR en_US
dc.idnumber x656555997 en_US
dc.publisher.city København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2007 en_US


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