Firms’ Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling


Union Jack

Firms’ Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling

Vis færre oplysninger Glazer, Amihai en_US Kanniainen, Vesa en_US Poutvaara, Panu en_US 2009-02-04T10:28:18Z 2009-02-04T10:28:18Z 2008-12-05T00:00:00Z en_US
dc.description.abstract This paper develops a theory of consumer boycotts. Some consumers care not only about the products they buy but also about whether the firm behaves ethically. Other consumers do not care about the behavior of the firm but yet may like to give the impression of being ethical consumers. Consequently, to affect a firm’s ethical behavior, moral consumers refuse to buy from an unethical firm. Consumers who do not care about ethical behavior may join the boycott to (falsely) signal that they do care. In the firm’s choice between ethical and unethical behavior, the optimality of mixed and pure strategies depends on the cost of behaving ethically. In particular, when the cost is (relatively) low, ethical behavior arises from a prisoners’ dilemma as the firm’s optimal strategy. en_US
dc.format.extent 21 s. en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2008-08 en_US
dc.title Firms’ Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt08dec05 nijemo en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Centre for Economic and Business Research en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort CEBR en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Centre for Economic and Business Research en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort CEBR en_US
dc.idnumber x65655737x en_US København en_US
dc.publisher.year 2008 en_US

Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.

Filer Størrelse Format Vis
dp 2008-08.pdf 220.5Kb PDF Vis/Åbn

Dette dokument findes i følgende samling(er)

Vis færre oplysninger