Browsing DRUID Working papers by Subject "industrial organization"
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Maskell, Peter; Lorenzen, Mark (København, 2003)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The many competing schools of thought concerning themselves with industrial clusters have at least one thing in common: they all agree that clusters are real life phenomena characterized by the co-localization of separate economic entities, which are in some sense related, but not joined together by any common ownership or management. So hierarchies they are certainly not. Yet, it is usually taken for granted that clusters, almost regardless of how they are defined, all expatriate the 'swollen middle' of various hybrid 'forms of long-term contracting, reciprocal trading, regulation, franchising and the like' residing somewhere between hierarchies and markets. This fundamental (but usually implicit) assumption would, perhaps, be justified if markets could be reduced to events of exchange of property rights, between large numbers of price-taking anonymous buyers and sellers supplied with perfect information as they are commonly conceived in mainstream economics. One of the original attractions of Neoclassical price theory was precisely that it promised a way of analysing the economy in general and market exchange in particular independently of specific institutional settings. However, introducing transaction costs as more than fees paid to intermediaries leads inevitably to comparative institutional analysis and, not to be forgotten, to the perception of markets as institutions with specific characteristics of their own. Some sets of characteristics are so common that they represent a specific market organization or market form. The cluster is one such specific market organization that is structured along territorial lines because this enables the building of a set of institutions that are helpful in conducting certain kinds of economic activities. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7265 Files in this item: 1
03-14.pdf (290.9Kb) -
past debates, central questions, and future research possibilitiesFoss, Nicolai Juul (København, 2002)[More information][Less information]
Abstract: The role of transaction cost economics in developing research in strategy has been a hotly debated topic over the last decade. This paper presents the radical argument that transaction cost insights are more than merely useful complements to existing approaches to strategy. Rather, they are necessary for adequately understanding the nature of strategizing. This is because transaction costs are essential aspects of processes of creating, capturing and protecting value. If transaction costs are zero, these processes do not pose any strategic problems; strategizing is trivialized in such a world. When transaction costs are positive, on the other hand, opportunities for value creation through the reduction of inefficiencies caused by transaction costs exist, and protecting and appropriating value are costly activities that dissipate value. Also, contracting and expectations enter as central aspects of strategizing. Arguments are provided for why economizing (with transaction costs) is more fundamental than strategizing (in the sense of exploiting market power). Thus, the paper argues that models in which the fullest possible account of transaction costs is made be used as the proper foundations and benchmarks for economics-based strategy research, rather than the patched-up competitive equilibrium models that are now used, more or less implicitly, as the benchmark in important parts of strategy research, most notably in the resource-based view. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/6911 Files in this item: 1
druid02-04.pdf (448.9Kb)
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