The Battle for Patent Rights in Plant Biotechnology: Evidence from Opposition

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dc.contributor.author	Schneider, Cédric
dc.date.accessioned	2010-11-23
dc.date.accessioned	2010-12-13T13:24:34Z
dc.date.available	2010-12-13T13:24:34Z
dc.date.issued	2010-12-13
dc.identifier.isbn	x656602588
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8220
dc.description.abstract	This paper describes and analyzes the occurrence and extent of oppositions initiated against plant biotechnology patents granted by the European Patent Office (EPO). The opposition mechanism is a legal procedure that allows any third party to challenge the validity of patents awarded by the EPO. Results indicate that the opposition rate is far greater in plant biotechnology than in other emerging industries. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the empirical findings suggest that opposed patents are disproportionately those that score high on features that proxy for their “value” or “quality”. In contrast to previous findings, however, the results show that large-volume applicants are more likely to be opposed. Because the boundaries of plant biotech patents are ill-defined, large patent portfolios do not promote cooperative behavior such as licensing or settlements. The analysis rejects the hypothesis that awardees are subject to “nuisance” or “frivolous” oppositions. Instead, the opposition procedure serves as an error correction mechanism.	en_US
dc.format.extent	28	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.title	The Battle for Patent Rights in Plant Biotechnology: Evidence from Opposition	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.accessionstatus	modt10dec13	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Økonomisk Institut	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort	ECON	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Department of Economics	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	ECON	en_US
dc.idnumber	x656602588	en_US
dc.publisher.city	Frederiksberg	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2010	en_US