Email Negotiation


Union Jack

Email Negotiation

Vis færre oplysninger Bülow, Anne Marie 2010-12-12 2011-01-19T13:39:54Z 2011-01-19T13:39:54Z 2011-01-19
dc.description.abstract This paper investigates a set of email negotiations in order to explain a high number of deadlocks. The paper argues that one reason is the combination of cognitive effort characteristic of the e-mail genre, and the argumentative pattern found when two parties simultaneously try to persuade the other of the justice of their cause. For a negotiation involving the wording of a contract, the evidence suggests that, while there is a distinct advantage in the features of reviewability and revisablity, the email format allows selective attention to the other party’s arguments, which can be shown to block suggestions and lead to sub-optimal results. en_US
dc.format.extent 19 en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.subject.other email negotiation en_US
dc.subject.other media richness en_US
dc.title Email Negotiation en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt11jan19 lbjl en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for Internationale Kultur- og Kommunikationsstudier en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort IKK en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of International Culture and Communication Studies en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort IKK en_US
dc.idnumber x65670335x en_US Frederiksberg en_US
dc.publisher.year 2010 en_US
dc.title.subtitle Argument, Cognition and Deadlock in Email Negotiation en_US

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