Email Negotiation

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dc.contributor.author	Bülow, Anne Marie
dc.date.accessioned	2010-12-12
dc.date.accessioned	2011-01-19T13:39:54Z
dc.date.available	2011-01-19T13:39:54Z
dc.date.issued	2011-01-19
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8239
dc.description.abstract	This paper investigates a set of email negotiations in order to explain a high number of deadlocks. The paper argues that one reason is the combination of cognitive effort characteristic of the e-mail genre, and the argumentative pattern found when two parties simultaneously try to persuade the other of the justice of their cause. For a negotiation involving the wording of a contract, the evidence suggests that, while there is a distinct advantage in the features of reviewability and revisablity, the email format allows selective attention to the other party’s arguments, which can be shown to block suggestions and lead to sub-optimal results.	en_US
dc.format.extent	19	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.subject.other	email negotiation	en_US
dc.subject.other	media richness	en_US
dc.title	Email Negotiation	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.accessionstatus	modt11jan19 lbjl	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Institut for Internationale Kultur- og Kommunikationsstudier	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort	IKK	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Department of International Culture and Communication Studies	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	IKK	en_US
dc.description.notes
dc.idnumber	x65670335x	en_US
dc.publisher.city	Frederiksberg	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2010	en_US
dc.title.subtitle	Argument, Cognition and Deadlock in Email Negotiation	en_US