Informal Unemployment and Education


Union Jack

Informal Unemployment and Education

Vis færre oplysninger Kolm, Ann-Sofie Larsen, Birthe 2011-08-05 2011-08-05T09:20:57Z 2011-08-05T09:20:57Z 2011-08-05
dc.description.abstract This paper develops a four sector equilibrium search and matching model with informal sector employment opportunities and educational choice. We show that underground activities reduce educational at- tainments if informal employment opportunities mainly are available to low educated workers. More zealous enforcement policy will in this case improve educational incentives as it reduces the attractiveness of remaining a low educated worker. Characterizing the optimal enforce- ment policies, we nd that relatively more audits should be targeted towards the sector employing low educated workers, elsewise a too low stock of educated workers is materialized. en_US
dc.format.extent 48 en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working paper;2-2011
dc.subject.other Tax evasion en_US
dc.subject.other the informal sector en_US
dc.subject.other Education en_US
dc.subject.other Matching en_US
dc.subject.other Unemployment en_US
dc.title Informal Unemployment and Education en_US
dc.type wp en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt11aug05 lbjl en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Økonomisk Institut en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort ECON en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of Economics en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort ECON en_US
dc.idnumber x656703775 en_US Frederiksberg en_US
dc.publisher.year 2011 en_US

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