Informal Unemployment and Education

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dc.contributor.author	Kolm, Ann-Sofie
dc.contributor.author	Larsen, Birthe
dc.date.accessioned	2011-08-05
dc.date.accessioned	2011-08-05T09:20:57Z
dc.date.available	2011-08-05T09:20:57Z
dc.date.issued	2011-08-05
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8328
dc.description.abstract	This paper develops a four sector equilibrium search and matching model with informal sector employment opportunities and educational choice. We show that underground activities reduce educational at- tainments if informal employment opportunities mainly are available to low educated workers. More zealous enforcement policy will in this case improve educational incentives as it reduces the attractiveness of remaining a low educated worker. Characterizing the optimal enforce- ment policies, we nd that relatively more audits should be targeted towards the sector employing low educated workers, elsewise a too low stock of educated workers is materialized.	en_US
dc.format.extent	48	en_US
dc.language	eng	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper;2-2011
dc.subject.other	Tax evasion	en_US
dc.subject.other	the informal sector	en_US
dc.subject.other	Education	en_US
dc.subject.other	Matching	en_US
dc.subject.other	Unemployment	en_US
dc.title	Informal Unemployment and Education	en_US
dc.type	wp	en_US
dc.accessionstatus	modt11aug05 lbjl	en_US
dc.contributor.corporation	Copenhagen Business School. CBS	en_US
dc.contributor.department	Økonomisk Institut	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort	ECON	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk	Department of Economics	en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort	ECON	en_US
dc.idnumber	x656703775	en_US
dc.publisher.city	Frederiksberg	en_US
dc.publisher.year	2011	en_US