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Abstract:
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During the last ten years there has been a rigorous debate on how to improve
anti-cartel enforcement in Europe. Introducing private enforcements
systems, like in the US, was early in the process regarded as one of the
most important steps for significant improvements. In contrast to public
enforcement, private enforcement relies on adequate compensation to customers
harmed by a cartel. But cartel damages are hard to calculate and
the European Commission has therefore presented a draft guideline on how
to quantify harm to assist courts and claimants.
The focus in the guidance is on price effects, but cartels are also likely to cause
other types of damage, such as efficiency effects. For example, a Swedish
committee investigating cartels in the 1950’s stated that
”A monopolist or a cartel can charge too high prices in relation to its costs. A
cartel determines prices after the least efficient firm in the cartel, and hence
protects it” (SOU 1951:27).
This statement reflects an early awareness that pricing and efficiency effects
from cartels are deeply related, and jointly determines the harm for consumers.
This thesis aims at re-joining the discussion of cartel prices and
efficiencies for the purpose of determining cartel damages. It will focus on
the issue outlined above, i.e. cartel behaviour and the harm caused by cartels
when a cartel consists of members that are not symmetric in costs. Cost
asymmetries can be both exogenous and endogenous to cartel formation, but
rather than discussing why asymmetries arise, I will in the four chapters focus
on the effect the asymmetries have on cartel prices and hence consumer
harm. |
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