The Owners and the Power

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The Owners and the Power

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dc.contributor.author Strand, Therese
dc.date.accessioned 2012-06-25
dc.date.accessioned 2012-06-25T08:20:40Z
dc.date.available 2012-06-25T08:20:40Z
dc.date.issued 2012-06-25
dc.identifier.isbn 9788792842770
dc.identifier.isbn 9788792842763
dc.identifier.issn 0906-6934
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8460
dc.description.abstract This thesis consists of five empirical studies, all relating to shareholder activism at annual general meetings. The first study concerns the structure and content of general meetings in Denmark and Sweden comparatively. The paper reveals significant differences in the level of activism, with Swedish investors being the most active in terms of proposals, proxy voting, and ‘voice’. The paper takes a legal approach, and discusses divergence in activism levels from the perspective of shareholder prerequisites to engage in monitoring efforts. Further, the paper investigating the topics addressed through questions and opinions. The results show that matters which can be categorized as irrelevant are reasonably rare. This is an important finding, as suggestions to abolish general meetings have often been based on the assumption that general meetings facilitate nothing but irrelevant, time consuming, and costly discussions that serves no monitoring function. The second study analyses the impact of voting power on shareholder activism. We hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between shareholder activism and a measure of the largest shareholder’s sensitivity to increased participation by small shareholders and find that firms’ amenability to small shareholder influence leads to more proposals by the nomination committee, but fewer proposals by other shareholders. We interpret this as evidence that the shareholder elected nomination committees effectively channel shareholder concerns and preempt other kinds of activism. Politicians and companies that desire active shareholders could improve the amenability of firms to shareholder influence by ownership transparency, shareholder committees, and contacts with shareholder associations and other vehicles for collective action... en_US
dc.format.extent 162 en_US
dc.language eng en_US
dc.publisher Copenhagen Business School en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries PhD Series;25.2012
dc.title The Owners and the Power en_US
dc.type phd en_US
dc.accessionstatus modt12jun25 lbjl en_US
dc.contributor.corporation Copenhagen Business School. CBS en_US
dc.contributor.department Institut for International Økonomi og Virksomhedsledelse en_US
dc.contributor.departmentshort INT en_US
dc.contributor.departmentuk Department of International Economics and Management en_US
dc.contributor.departmentukshort INT en_US
dc.idnumber 9788792842770 en_US
dc.publisher.city Frederiksberg en_US
dc.publisher.year 2012 en_US
dc.title.subtitle Insights from Annual General Meetings en_US


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