Real-time Pricing in Power Markets

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Real-time Pricing in Power Markets

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Titel: Real-time Pricing in Power Markets
Who Gains?
Forfatter: Boom, Anette; Schwenen, Sebastian
Resume: We examine welfare e ects of real-time pricing in electricity markets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers contract with nal consumers who exogenously do not have real-time meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete in a uniform price auction to satisfy demand from retailers acting on behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does not always increase welfare since risk-averse consumers dislike uncertain and high prices arising through market power. In the Bertrand case, welfare is the same with all or no consumers on smart meters.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8766
Dato: 2013-10-22

Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.

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