Partnering Contracts

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Partnering Contracts

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Titel: Partnering Contracts
A Solution to the Nash Equilibrium?
Forfatter: Tvarnø, Christina D.
Resume: This paper discusses partnering contracts in Denmark and Great Britain, analyses the legal content and applies game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma game on some of the legal clauses and objectives. The paper defines partnering contracts as alternative social contracts relevant when forming a strategic alliance or another long-term relationship with a certain degree of specificity and frequency. It is not the aim of partnering contracts to replace the traditional contracts. The paper focuses on partnering in the construction industry and compares the clauses in both Danish and British partnering contracts. Based on the analysis, the paper sets up a scientific definition regarding the aim of partnering contracts and shows that economic theory can explain the legal clauses in the partnering contract, and the partnering contract can solve inefficiency in the Nash Equilibrium in the prisoner’s dilemma game. The partnering contract makes it possible to obtain the benefit from joint utility and the paper proposes some legal improvements in this regard.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8909
Dato: 2014-04-22
Note: Paper presented at joint conference between CBS & Haifa Copenhagen, August 2013

Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.

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